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A TYPOLOGY OF JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
LAWYERS’ ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES*
REBECCA ROIPHE**
President Trump’s administration has persistently challenged the legitimacy of
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). In the past, DOJ, like other governmental
institutions, has been fairly resilient. Informal norms and practices have served
to preserve its proper functioning, even under pressure. The strain of the past
three years, however, has been different in kind and scale. This Article offers a
typology of different roles for DOJ lawyers and argues that over time the
institution has evolved by allocating different functions and responsibilities to
different positions within DOJ. By doing so, it has for the most part maintained
the proper balance between independence and responsiveness to the
administration. By explaining these roles and responsibilities, this Article both
describes the different DOJ lawyer roles and seeks to strengthen the institution
by making the informal norms that preserve and protect its mission more explicit.
The Article concludes that, as DOJ expanded, it evolved to allow the Attorney
General to balance the political and legal responsibilities of his office. He does so
by advising and implementing administration policies while preventing
impermissible political considerations from influencing those DOJ officials who
are charged with the neutral interpretation and enforcement of the law.
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INTRODUCTION
President Trump’s unwillingness to abide by presidential and democratic
norms has led to an increased concern about the resilience of American
democracy and its institutions.1 His refusal to play by the rules has highlighted
how much of our system is built on informal traditions that guide presidential
conduct.2 Like the presidency, other American democratic institutions are fluid
and imprecise. The work they do is discretionary and, in turn, depends on
traditions, practices, and the judgment of the individuals who work within
them. These informal norms and institutional practices have worked fairly well
up until now. Of course, there have been moments of stress and even failure,
but for the most part institutional practices have been sufficient to sustain
fundamental aspects of American democracy. As the President defies these
norms, however, it becomes increasingly critical to acknowledge and sustain
them.
One of the President’s unconventional tactics is accusing institutions and
individuals that hold government actors accountable of being purely partisan
players. Unsurprisingly, one of the main targets of his accusations has been the
1. See, e.g., David Frum, How To Build an Autocracy, ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/how-to-build-an-autocracy/513872/
[https://perma.cc/8A3J-CA96 (dark archive)].
2. See generally Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018)
[hereinafter Renan, Presidential Norms] (describing the norms that augment and constrain the
presidential power).
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Department of Justice (“DOJ”).3 The professional, nonpartisan norms and the
practices designed to promote those norms within the DOJ are fundamental to
the rule of law.4 The purpose of this Article is to strengthen these informal
norms and traditions by giving them greater definition and clarity.
Since President Trump’s inauguration, journalists and scholars have paid
increased attention to government lawyers’ conduct.5 Are lawyers employed to
help the administration avoid obstacles to its ends? Are they there to protect
the American public? Do they constitute a check on power or another tool in its
exercise? The answer to these questions depends on the position that the lawyer
holds and the work that the lawyer is doing. As a whole, the Department of
Justice ought to strike a proper balance between responsiveness and
independence, ensuring effectiveness and accountability while maintaining
enough independence from the President to guarantee the orderly development
of the law and its fair application.
DOJ as a whole ought to be fair in interpreting the meaning of the law and
independent from political influence in enforcing it in individual cases. But it
should not be so separate and unaccountable that it fails to give effect to the
administration’s policies and priorities. This Article argues that the roles of the
different lawyers within DOJ ought to be defined to advance these twin goals.6
3. Recently, Trump called the FBI “scum” at a rally in Pennsylvania. Tom Porter, Trump Called
the FBI ‘Scum’ and Hit Out at the Report that Discredited His Theory the Russia Probe Was a Deep-State Plot
at a Wild Pennsylvania Rally, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/trumpcalled-the-fbi-scum-at-a-pennsylvania-rally-2019-12 [https://perma.cc/H4HE-P2P6].
4. The rule of law is hard to define precisely and many have offered requirements. Aristotle
articulated an important conception of the rule of law in Book III of his Politics: “[I]t is as much a man’s
duty to submit to command as to assume it . . . for this is law, for order is law; and it is more proper
that law should govern than any one of the citizens . . . .” ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III, at 117
(William Ellis trans., London, George Routledge & Sons Ltd. 1895) (c. 384 B.C.E.). John Adams
famously repeated this sentiment when he drafted the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, writing that the rule of law requires a “government of laws and not of men.” MASS.
CONST. art. XXX. For my purposes, I will assume that the rule of law requires at least the fair and
equal application of known and clear laws to all people, including government officials, and that the
processes for enacting and enforcing the laws are fair and efficient. See generally Robert A. Stein, What
Exactly Is the Rule of Law?, 57 HOUS. L. REV. 185, 187–98 (2019) (offering an overview of historical
definitions of the term and distilling critical principles of the rule of law from them).
5. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Sally Yates, Ronald Dworkin, and the Best View of the Law, 115
MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 78, 87–90 (2017) (criticizing then–Acting Attorney General Sally Yates’s
decision not to defend the President’s travel ban); James Hohmann, The Daily 202: All the President’s
Lawyers. Four Government Attorneys Find Themselves Embroiled in Trump’s Ukraine Mess, WASH. POST
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/daily-202/2019/09/26/
daily-202-all-the-president-s-lawyers-four-government-attorneys-find-themselves-embroiled-intrump-s-ukraine-mess/5d8c53eb88e0fa4b0ec2463e/ [https://perma.cc/8WNR-9QBS (dark archive)]
(discussing the involvement of attorneys in limiting the President’s exposure for withholding funds to
Ukraine).
6. There is evidence that the effort to preserve independence already animates DOJ policy in
many ways. For example, the Justice Manual authorizes only some positions within DOJ to
communicate with the legislature. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL §§ 1-8.100–.200 (Dec.
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With this principle in mind, the Article describes the different roles of
Department of Justice lawyers and lays out the ethical obligations that ought to
accompany those roles.7 In order to prescribe how government lawyers should
act, it is critical to understand what it is they do. The same lawyer may play
more than one role, in which case her obligations may vary. The reason for the
complexity is that government lawyers use the law in different ways. At times,
the law is a constraint on power. At others, it is a mechanism for resolving
disputes. And in other instances, it is an appropriate tool in the exercise of the
state’s coercive power. The goal is to maintain the neutrality of law and its
evenhanded application to objectively determined facts, so that the Department
of Justice can remain a constraint on power while not unnecessarily hobbling
the elected officials in their ability to implement policy.
This Article argues that the Department of Justice has, over the course of
the last century and a half, stumbled toward the proper roles and responsibilities
for different lawyers. It has, in essence, achieved a fairly good balance between
the need for responsiveness and independence. The main purpose of the Article,
then, is to clarify these roles, how they have developed, and why. To be sure,
not all scholars agree on the proper role of different government attorneys, and
so the aim of the Article is not merely descriptive.8 At times, it weighs in on
these debates to offer a normative suggestion based on the need to ensure an
effective yet independent Justice Department.
There is value in using examples from the Trump administration to
illustrate the different roles of government lawyers, because the President’s
repeated assaults on legal institutions has highlighted how central lawyers’
ethical obligations are to the rule of law. He has, in essence, exposed the fault
lines. Without a neutral mechanism to apply and interpret the law, this vital
aspect of American democracy is in jeopardy. In some respects, the rule of law
is a game of trust. If the public loses faith in the institutions that implement the
2019) [hereinafter JUSTICE MANUAL], https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-1-8000-congressionalrelations#1-8.100 [https://perma.cc/L4WR-RS8J]. Many scholars have noted the dual responsibility of
the Attorney General to the law and political actors. See, e.g., DANIEL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT,
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 26 (1980); Robert E. Palmer,
Comment, The Confrontation of the Legislative and Executive Branches: An Examination of the Constitutional
Balance of Powers and the Role of the Attorney General, 11 PEPP. L. REV. 331, 349 (1984).
7. There are several offices within DOJ that this Article does not cover: the Civil Rights
Division, the Antitrust Division, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review, to name a few.
Obviously, books can be, and have been, written on each of these positions and offices, and this Article’s
purpose of giving a broad overview can only be achieved by being selective.
8. Compare Bruce A. Green, Must Government Lawyers “Seek Justice” in Civil Litigation?, 9
WIDENER J. PUB. L. 235, 243–48 (2000) [hereinafter Green, Must Government Lawyers] (arguing that
civil division DOJ attorneys have a duty to do justice beyond the dictates of agency heads), with
Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1293, 1294, 1298 (1987) (arguing that civil division DOJ lawyers owe an obligation to the agency heads
rather than a direct duty to do justice on behalf of the public).
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law, then the group with the greatest power to enforce its will always wins. The
President’s statements, on Twitter and elsewhere, have the power to undermine
this trust. When the President criticizes the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”),9 DOJ,10 or Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s investigation,11 he
undermines the law as a serious constraint on power. When he accuses courts
of being captive to one party or another, once again he threatens to collapse law
into power.12 When he orders the investigation and prosecution of political
enemies, he tramples on an essential democratic principle.13 When President
Trump mischaracterizes facts, like the content of the Mueller Report,14 he
destabilizes the law itself, which is dependent on faith in a discernible reality.
In politics, discernible reality itself is based on a basic faith in the institutions
whose job is to ascertain that reality.15
The premise for my argument about each type of government lawyer is
that government lawyers ought to approach their job in a way that supports an
9. See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos & Michael S. Schmidt, Trump Tweets Lengthy Attack on F.B.I. over
Inquiry into Possible Aid to Russia, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/12/
us/politics/trump-fbi-counterintelligence-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/N74A-VUBQ (dark
archive)].
10. See, e.g., Katie Benner & Adam Goldman, A Darker Portrait Emerges of Trump’s Attacks on the
Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/us/
politics/justice-department-trump-attack-mueller.html
[https://perma.cc/GNY8-DEH8
(dark
archive)].
11. See, e.g., Larry Buchanan & Karen Yourish, Trump Has Publicly Attacked the Russia Investigation
More than 1,100 Times, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2019/02/19/us/politics/trump-attacks-obstruction-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/F3FS-CNF8
(dark archive)].
12. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Rebuking Trump’s Criticism of ‘Obama Judge,’ Chief Justice Roberts Defends
Judiciary as ‘Independent,’ WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
rebuking-trumps-criticism-of-obama-judge-chief-justice-roberts-defends-judiciary-as-independent/
2018/11/21/6383c7b2-edb7-11e8-96d4-0d23f2aaad09_story.html
[https://perma.cc/Y2ZD-MXMC
(dark archive)]; Allyson Chiu, Trump Attacks Federal Judge, Prosecutors in Twitter Tirade Defending Roger
Stone, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/02/12/trumpstone-judge/ [https://perma.cc/LJ4Q-NZKW (dark archive)]. President Trump has not only accused
courts of partisan bias, he has also suggested that a juror in the Roger Stone case was similarly
motivated. See Spencer S. Hsu & John Wagner, Roger Stone Asks for New Trial in Sealed Motion, One
Day After Trump Accused Jury Forewoman of Bias, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/roger-stone-asks-for-new-trial-in-sealed-motionone-day-after-trump-accused-jury-forewoman-of-bias/2020/02/14/1e36e412-4f65-11ea-9b5ceac5b16dafaa_story.html [https://perma.cc/NLW3-GAYU (dark archive)].
13. See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Wanted To Order Justice Dept. To
Prosecute Comey and Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/
us/politics/president-trump-justice-department.html [https://perma.cc/SLV6-E9YJ (dark archive)].
14. See, e.g., Jordan Fabian, Trump on Mueller Report: ‘Complete and Total Exoneration,’ HILL (Mar.
24, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/435533-trump-on-mueller-report-completeand-total-exoneration [https://perma.cc/NJ9G-KANN].
15. This is not to say that institutions like DOJ are perfect or incorruptible, a claim that is easily
belied by history. Checks and balances, supervision, and oversight are indispensable. But those ought
to be layered over a basic faith that, unless there is some proof that things have gone awry, these
institutions operate fairly and without political bias.
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institution designed to implement and interpret the law in an evenhanded way,
in light of administration priorities. While seemingly simple, the assertion of
presidential priorities can, at times, impede the fair interpretation and
evenhanded enforcement of the law. The government should define lawyers’
roles so as to preserve the law as a neutral and legitimate mechanism for
resolving disputes and as a real check on power without undermining the ability
of elected officials to articulate and implement the administration’s policy
objectives. Interpreting government lawyers’ obligations with this larger goal in
mind leads to a view of government lawyers’ ethics that varies given the role
the particular lawyer plays.
Before laying out the respective roles of DOJ lawyers in Part II, Part I
provides a brief overview of the history of the Attorney General’s office and
the DOJ. This history supports the premise of the Article that DOJ ought to be
designed to promote independence without sacrificing appropriate
responsiveness to administration priorities. It also shows the evolution of the
law department as the nature and scope of the law and government changed.
While not perfect, the delegation and delineation of different roles within DOJ
reflects an effort to preserve the independence and effectiveness of the law
department as a whole. Part III uses the outline developed in the earlier parts
to assess the conduct of certain DOJ lawyers during the Trump administration.
The Article concludes by cautioning observers to pay attention to context in
analyzing and criticizing government lawyer conduct. It revisits the premise
that government lawyers play different roles and together all of them preserve
the proper functioning of government by serving as neutral arbiters of disputes,
expositors and evenhanded enforcers of law, as well as a real constraint on power
when appropriate.
As the federal government and DOJ grew larger and more complex, the
Attorney General’s job developed as a hybrid political and legal position. Other
positions such as the Solicitor General, the Office of Legal Counsel, and United
States Attorneys took up the legal work, freeing the Attorney General to serve
as a political advisor to the President. In this role, the Attorney General is a
critical cabinet member responsible for devising and implementing
administration goals. But he retains responsibility for protecting those DOJ
lawyers charged with enforcing the law from political pressure. Thus, DOJ
evolved to allow the Attorney General to serve as a political adviser helping the
administration develop a legal strategy to implement and advance its policy
goals while simultaneously ensuring that the law is developed and enforced in
an evenhanded and fair way.
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Early Government Lawyers: Before 1870

The Department of Justice was not created until 1870.16 Congress formed
the position of the Attorney General when it passed the Judiciary Act of 1789.17
This legislation provided for district courts in each state and three circuit
courts.18 These courts settled disputes between private parties, but they also
heard cases in which the government had a stake.19 Thus, the Act provided for
a meet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the
United States . . . to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme
Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his
advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President
of the United States, or when requested by the heads of any of the
departments, touching any matters that may concern their
departments.20
The legislation also provided that there be appointed “in each district a meet
person learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States . . . and all
civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned.”21 At the time, much
prosecution was initiated by private parties,22 and the Attorney General’s
central purpose was interpreting, not enforcing, the law.23 The job of law
enforcement was decentralized, delegated to district attorneys over whom the
Attorney General had little control.24
The original draft of the Judiciary Act explicitly gave courts the
responsibility to appoint the government attorney who would appear before
them. According to the discarded draft, the Supreme Court would have been
responsible for appointing the Attorney General, and the district courts would
have each appointed their own government attorneys.25 This early draft could
be seen as endorsing a view, extant at the time, that prosecutors were quasijudicial officers. By changing this language, Congress implicitly gave the
President the responsibility of appointing the Attorney General under the

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93.
Id. §§ 3–4, 1 Stat. at 73–75.
Id. §§ 9–12, 1 Stat. at 76–80.
Id. § 35, 1 Stat. at 93.
Id. at 92.
See HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE
HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 15 (1937).
23. LUTHER A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 6 (1967).
24. Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA.
L. REV. 1, 41 (2018) [hereinafter Green & Roiphe, Can the President Control].
25. Id.
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Appointments Clause of the Constitution.26 It is not clear that this was a welltheorized change, but it could be seen as ensuring that the Attorney General
would be more responsive to administration needs. The Act was silent on the
question of removal, and Congress did not assign the role to the President—as
it had with the Secretaries of War and Treasury—though the President
gradually assumed the responsibility.27 Perhaps less concerned with the
President’s ability to control the Attorney General, Congress likely assumed
that the Attorney General would be a relatively weak position and take direction
from both Congress and the President in representing the interests of the
country as a whole.28
The Attorney General was not initially a cabinet position. To the contrary,
it was a part-time and poorly paid job without an office or resources.29 The
diminished role likely reflected Congress’s concern about a strong federal
judiciary and robust federal law enforcement powers. From early in his
administration, however, President George Washington found that important
matters involved so many legal questions that it was useful to have the chief law
officer at cabinet meetings.30 From 1792 on, the Attorney General was
recognized as a cabinet post.31
Congress did not centralize federal legal power before the creation of DOJ
in part because at least some feared the power of federal government relative to
that of the states. Concerned about the threat of a distant federal government,
any such centralization might jeopardize the relative power of the states as well
as individual liberty.32 In addition, as the early drafts of the Judiciary Act reflect,
the Attorney General was seen by at least some as a quasi-judicial role.33 Despite
periodic efforts and calls by both Presidents and Attorneys General to
consolidate the legal arm of government, Congress continued to disperse legal
power throughout the federal government.34 For instance, in 1820 it created the
Comptroller of the Treasury, which was responsible for recovering debts owed
to the government,35 and ten years later it created the Solicitor of the Treasury,

26. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
27. Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the
Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 579–80.
28. See id. at 580–81.
29. See NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 55–56 (1992).
30. See HUSTON, supra note 23, at 51.
31. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 53.
32. HUSTON, supra note 23, at 7.
33. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 47.
34. See, e.g., Green & Roiphe, Can the President Control, supra note 24, at 47; Jed Handelsman
Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil
Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 133 (2014).
35. Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 107, § 1, 3 Stat. 592, 592.
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which exercised control over the local United States Attorneys.36 Over the next
decades, with an expanding role for federal agencies, Congress created legal
positions within agencies that were authorized to represent the United States
in court, which increasingly scattered authority across the federal government.37
Through the first few decades of the nineteenth century, Attorneys
General spent most of their time providing Congress opinions on the
constitutionality of laws and reporting on the nature of the judiciary.38 In 1792,
the Attorney General assumed the role of representing the United States’
interests in the Supreme Court. Attorney General William Randolph appeared
before the Supreme Court to argue for the constitutionality of a statute which
required lower courts to certify veterans’ applications for pensions.39 In making
his argument, Randolph argued that it was part of his role to “superintend the
decisions of the inferior courts, and if to him they appeared improper, to move
the supreme court for a revision.”40 In other words, the Attorney General served
the administration by making sure the laws were faithfully executed.
The role of Attorney General grew in importance. In 1817, when William
Wirt took the position, he rationalized the activities of the office and sought to
ensure that opinions were written down so that they would remain consistent
and develop rationally over time.41 He also limited the legal advice to those
named in the Judiciary Act—the President and department heads.42 He
ultimately refused to give legal opinions to private parties and to Congress.43
Opinions grew to have the force of law until withdrawn by a successor or
overruled by courts.44 Wirt conceived his role as nonpartisan and judicial:
I do not consider myself an advocate of the government, . . . but as a
judge, called to decide a question of law with the impartiality and
integrity which characterizes the judician. I should consider myself as
dishonoring the high-minded government, whose officer I am, in
permitting my judgment to be warped in deciding any question officially
by the one sided artifice of the professional advocate.45
He considered himself an adviser to the executive branch, but also bound to a
neutral reading of the law.

36. Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 153, §§ 1, 5, 4 Stat. 414, 414–15.
37. See CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND
THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 23–24 (1992).
38. See CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 22, at 24–26.
39. See id. at 27.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 79–80; HUSTON, supra note 23, at 19–21.
42. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 15–16.
43. See id.; CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 22, at 86.
44. HUSTON, supra note 23, at 34.
45. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 22, at 90.
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In 1854, Caleb Cushing, the Attorney General to President Franklin
Pierce, wrote an opinion describing the role of the Attorney General.46 He
explained that the Attorney General was a quasi-judicial position and when
asked to give an opinion on the meaning of the law, the response had to be
neutral.47 Reflecting on the Attorney General’s opinion-writing function,
Cushing explained:
It frequently happens that questions of great importance, submitted to
[the Attorney General] for determination, are elaborately argued by
counsel; and whether it be so or not, he feels, in the performance of this
part of his duty, that he is not a counsel giving advice to the Government
as his client, but a public officer, acting judicially, under all the solemn
responsibilities of conscience and of legal obligation.48
Cushing supported this position by arguing that, for administrative conduct,
the Attorney General’s opinion is final and relieves public officers of
responsibility if they act in accord with his decisions.49 Legal opinions also affect
the rights of private individuals who come before administrative agencies who
have no other way to ascertain or challenge the meaning of the rule, law, or
practice.50 But Cushing also called for greater centralization to promote
efficiency and uniformity.51
B.

The Creation of DOJ and Its Development

Recognizing the increasing need for efficiency and uniformity in federal
law, the Joint Committee on Retrenchment and Reform introduced an “Act To
Establish the Department of Justice,”52 which was ultimately passed in 1870.53
The Act created the role of Solicitor General and two Assistant Attorneys
General to whom the Attorney General could delegate.54 The statute also
centralized the legal work of the federal government in one department. It
removed lawyers from different agencies and executive branches and relocated
them within the DOJ.55 The point was not to deprive agencies of legal assistance
to effectuate their mission but rather to create order and consistency by placing
them under the control of the Attorney General.56

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Office & Duties of Attorney Gen., 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 326 (1854).
Id. at 333–34.
Id. at 334.
Id.
Id.
See id.
HUSTON, supra note 23, at 35–36.
Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162.
Id. § 2, 16 Stat. at 162.
Id. § 3, 16 Stat. at 162.
See Green & Roiphe, Can the President Control, supra note 24, at 49.
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In addition to addressing waste and inconsistency in federal law
enforcement, there was significant concern that political appointees within
different agencies would corrupt their lawyers and undermine their
independence: Representative Thomas Jenckes, who introduced the bill that
created the DOJ, explained that counsel for particular agencies might be
subject to the control of the heads of the Departments, in some instances
give advice which seems to have been instigated by the heads of the
Department, or at least advice which seems designed to strengthen the
resolution to which the head of the Department may have come in a
particular instance.57
Despite the commitment to consolidating legal work in the DOJ, Congress did
not repeal prior laws creating department lawyers, so there remained significant
competition for legal work among different federal government lawyers.58 As
the administrative state grew more complex in the early twentieth century,
there were an increasing number of lawyers within different agencies.59
Presidents continuously sought to harmonize and rationalize all legal work
within DOJ.60
As the legal work of the federal government grew more extensive and
complex, some of the Attorney General’s functions were delegated to others
both within and outside of DOJ. While the role of Solicitor General was created
in 1870, other offices emerged over time, each with its own mandate. In part,
the delegation of duties was a practical response to the volume of legal work,
but it was also a way to manage the complex legal and political position of the
Attorney General. Thus, roles developed not only with different obligations but
also with different traditions, customs, and practices, ensuring different levels
of independence from the Attorney General himself and the political branches.
For instance, the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division
was created in 1919 as the federal criminal laws expanded.61 His unit was
assigned all cases arising out of federal criminal law, and he was responsible for
supervising all Assistant United States Attorneys.62 The Civil Division was
formed in 1933, consolidating a number of other units under the auspices of one
57. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3036 (1870).
58. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 63.
59. See MEADOR, supra note 6, at 11.
60. During World War I, President Woodrow Wilson issued an executive order consolidating
legal work under DOJ. BAKER, supra note 29, at 63. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued a
similar order. Exec. Order No. 6166, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 901 (2018). President Dwight
D. Eisenhower’s Hoover Commission concluded that the lack of centralization harmed efficiency and
that centralization would minimize political influence over legal work. JAMES MICHAEL STRINE, THE
OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL: LEGAL PROFESSIONALS IN A POLITICAL SYSTEM 71 (1992).
61. See History, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/history
[https://perma.cc/9TZS-LLK4].
62. See 1919 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 75.
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Assistant Attorney General.63 The Criminal Division continued to grow, and
three subdivisions were created in 1936: the administrative, trial, and appellate
sections.64 In 1957, after the Civil Rights Act was passed,65 the civil rights work
was moved out of the Criminal Division into the newly created Civil Rights
Division.66
As a matter of practice, lawyers scattered throughout government agencies
wrote opinions on the meaning of the law until 1870, when opinion writing, like
other legal work, was consolidated in DOJ.67 In 1933, Congress created the
Office of the Assistant to the Solicitor General, a position that would be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.68 Later that year,
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt issued an executive order requiring that
all proposed executive orders and proclamations be submitted to the Attorney
General for approval.69 This role of legal opinion writing was moved out from
under the Solicitor General’s control and then renamed the Office of Legal
Counsel twenty years later.70
In 1939, six years after the President created the predecessor to the Office
of Legal Counsel, Congress passed a reorganization plan which authorized the
President to establish the Office of White House Counsel by executive order.71
While this Article does not analyze the role of White House Counsel—the
lawyer to the presidency—since it is not within DOJ, it is significant in
discussing the internal structure of DOJ to note that a separate attorney for the
presidency could theoretically free the Attorney General to focus on his role as
counsel for the United States by ridding him of his direct obligations to the
President. In other words, the creation of the White House Counsel would give
the President a source of personal legal advice such that he would no longer
63. See Organization, Mission and Functions Manual: Civil Division, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 9,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual-civil-division
[https://perma.cc/GX9W-8EFK]; see also 1933 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 83–89.
64. History, supra note 61; see also Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1938: Hearings on H.R.
5779 Before the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 75th Cong. 25 (1937) (statement of Brien
McMahon, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States).
65. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26, 42, and 52 U.S.C.).
66. History, supra note 61.
67. See Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, §§ 3, 14, 16 Stat. 162, 162, 164.
68. Fourth Deficiency Act, Fiscal Year 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-78, § 16, 48 Stat. 283, 307–08.
69. See Exec. Order No. 6247 (Aug. 10, 1933), superseded by Exec. Order No. 7298, 1 Fed. Reg.
2284 (Feb. 18, 1936).
70. See HUSTON, supra note 23, at 61.
71. Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-19, § 4, 53 Stat. 561, 562. On April 25, 1939,
President Roosevelt submitted Reorganization Plan No. 1, which created the Executive Office. See S.J.
Res. 138, 76th Cong., 53 Stat. 813, 813 (1939); Reorganization Plan No. 1, 4 Fed. Reg. 2727, 2727–28
(July 1, 1939). The first White House Counsel was appointed by President Roosevelt in 1943. See Nina
Totenberg, ‘The Quiet Man’: The Powerful Conservative White House Lawyer in the Middle of It All, NPR
(June 6, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/06/06/531337749/the-quiet-man-the-powerful-conservativewhite-house-lawyer-in-the-middle-of-it-a [https://perma.cc/8BBE-CRXS].
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need to rely solely on the Attorney General. In theory, this could reduce the
conflicts inherent in serving the President’s interests and that of the country as
a whole. In 1953, DOJ began codifying its internal policy and procedures for
attorneys, to promote consistent enforcement of federal law in accordance with
accepted principles.72
The Watergate scandal caused Congress to revisit the roles of the Attorney
General and the Department of Justice. Moved by the sense that Attorneys
General John Mitchell and Richard Kleindienst had succumbed to political
pressure from the President, Representative Sam Ervin proposed a bill that
would have made DOJ into an independent agency.73 But others resisted this
measure, in part because they viewed the significance of events differently.74 In
what has become known as the Saturday Night Massacre, President Nixon
ordered two successive Attorneys General to fire Archibald Cox, the special
prosecutor who was investigating him and his administration.75 When they
refused, he fired them. Finally, after being appointed in their stead, Attorney
General Robert Bork agreed to get rid of Cox, but Bork ultimately appointed a
new special counsel who continued the investigation into Nixon and the
Watergate break-in.76 Many, like Ervin, viewed this as an unprecedented and
unacceptable assault on the independence of the DOJ. After extensive hearings
involving expert testimony, other congressmen concluded that the Saturday
Night Massacre proved the resilience of the DOJ and the integrity of its
lawyers. They concluded that there was no need to create an independent
agency, because, under significant strain, DOJ held up well, and the cost to
political accountability would be too great if the country were to operate with
an entirely independent law enforcement agency.77
Unsurprisingly, the Attorneys General who followed on the heels of the
Watergate scandal tended to be more independent and less clearly political or
partisan. But independence came at a cost. They risked losing their seat at the
table and were often excluded from important policy decisions. While their
independent legal voice was certainly their strength, it was also a liability that
left them at times isolated from important policy decisions and debate.78
President Gerald Ford, for instance, nominated Edward Levi, an academic who

72. See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 369, 398 (2009).
73. See Green & Roiphe, Can the President Control, supra note 24, at 62–64.
74. See id. at 64–66.
75. See Ron Elving, A Brief History of Nixon’s ‘Saturday Night Massacre,’ NPR (Oct. 21, 2018),
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/21/659279158/a-brief-history-of-nixons-saturday-night-massacre
[https://perma.cc/64XR-FFBT].
76. See id.
77. See Green & Roiphe, Can the President Control, supra note 24, at 64–68.
78. Cf. BAKER, supra note 29, at 145–46.
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had a reputation as a scholar and independent legal mind.79 But, on important
matters, Ford often relied on Philip Buchen, his White House Counsel,
instead.80 President Jimmy Carter’s Attorney General, Griffin Bell, similarly
promoted his independence from political and partisan influence. Bell explained
that the Department of Justice is “the people’s law department.”81 But when
asked to clarify, he stated: “It is according to what you think about
representative government. I think of the Congress and the President as
representing the people.”82 He went on to explain that if the President is no
longer acting as a faithful fiduciary of the people, Bell would represent the
people in a more direct way.83
In keeping with his emphasis on independence, Bell sought to implement
new policies and structures to minimize political influence on the DOJ. For
one, DOJ placed restrictions on communications between the administration
and law enforcement officers or federal prosecutors, providing that all such
communications should go through the Attorney General or his deputies,
essentially tasking them with screening out improper partisan motivation.84
These restrictions, first drafted by Attorney General Bell, are still in place.85 In
addition to the communication procedures, Congress created both an Inspector
General and the Office of Professional Responsibility within DOJ to address
potential abuses and reinforce professional norms.86 These changes reflect a new
emphasis on the Attorney General as a filter, who enables proper policy

79. In his confirmation hearing, Levi asserted that DOJ law enforcement decisions would be
independent from politics while repudiating the idea of a completely independent law department.
Nomination of Edward H. Levi To Be Attorney General: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. 6 (1975) (statement Edward H. Levi) (“I do not believe that the administration of justice should
be a partisan matter in the sense that I do not think, and I assume we all agree, that cases should be
brought to reward people or to punish them for partisan reasons. . . . If it is meant that the Department
of Justice is to be a separate institution unrelated to the governmental processes which govern the
United States, and the relationships between the Executive and the Congress, and this committee, then
I do not think it is possible to remove the Department from that kind of relationship, nor would I think
in our system of government that it would be desirable.”). Griffin Bell made similar assertions at his
confirmation hearing. See The Prospective Nomination of Griffin B. Bell To Be Attorney General: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 33 (1977) (statement of Griffin B. Bell) [hereinafter
Bell Confirmation Hearing].
80. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 146.
81. Bell Confirmation Hearing, supra note 79, at 10.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 11.
84. See Attorney Gen. Griffin B. Bell, Address Before Department of Justice Lawyers 7 (Sept. 6,
1978) [hereinafter Bell, Address Before DOJ Lawyers], https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/09-06-1978b.pdf [https://perma.cc/4G5U-WYRC].
85. See Memorandum from Donald F. McGahn II, Counsel to the President, to All White House
Staff (Jan. 27, 2017), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015a-dde8-d23c-a7ff-dfef4d530000
[https://perma.cc/CAR8-QX97].
86. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-156, PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT:
DOJ COULD STRENGTHEN PROCEDURES FOR DISCIPLINING ITS ATTORNEYS 2, 11 (2014).
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priorities to reach United States Attorneys but ensures that their judgment will
not be distorted by improper partisan or personal concerns of elected officials.
Over time, the shock of Watergate wore off and subsequent Attorneys
General approached their jobs differently, many assuming a more direct role in
the cabinet as policy advisers. The DOJ, as a whole, has similarly been accused
of playing too politicized a role.87 What has been consistent, though, is a sense
of the need to embody both responsiveness and independence, even if the
proper balance has been controversial and elusive.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Over time, as Part I illustrates, the Attorney General’s job was divided,
delegated to different individuals and offices. Each office was assigned a
different task. This part offers a fuller description of the contemporary work of
each office and argues for distinct ethical obligations based on their respective
roles. It describes and analyzes the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney
General for the Civil Division, the Office of Legal Counsel, the Solicitor
General, and the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. Of
course, there is overlap in responsibilities of the offices, as this part makes clear,
but the object is to derive basic ethical obligations of government lawyers from
the work they do in light of the goals of the Constitution. It concludes that
there is a continuum, a spectrum in these roles: the Attorney General is the
most responsive to the White House and federal prosecutors are the most
insulated from political influence. The Attorney General’s job is, in critical part,
to maintain the proper balance between independence and political
responsiveness within DOJ, by screening out improper partisan influence while
communicating and implementing the administration’s agenda where
appropriate.
A.

The Attorney General

Government lawyers, academics, and historians have been debating the
proper role of the Attorney General in American democracy since its
inception.88 The Attorney General has obligations to the administration and the
President but retains responsibilities to the law itself. These obligations are
often in tension. This section concludes that the Attorney General is both a
political and a legal post. The Attorney General’s client is the public, but he is,
for the most part, obligated to defer to the President or other duly chosen

87. See, e.g., Tucker Higgins, Jeff Sessions Fires Back at Trump: DOJ Won’t ‘Be Improperly Influenced’
by Politics, CNBC (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/23/jeff-sessions-pushes-backagainst-trump-actions-of-doj-will-not-be-improperly-influenced-by-political-considerations.html
[https://perma.cc/M9MB-Y9UD].
88. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 2; Bloch, supra note 27, at 562.
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officials, as representatives of the public.89 At other times, his obligation to help
the administration execute the laws faithfully requires great independence. This
section will survey the Attorney General’s job broadly and then argue that one
way he fulfills this complex role is to serve as a filter allowing proper policy
priorities to penetrate the DOJ while screening out improper political or
partisan concerns from legal analysis and law enforcement decisions, where they
ought to play no part.
1. The Role of the Attorney General
The Attorney General has formal responsibility for most of the activities
of DOJ, but as discussed above, much of the work has been delegated; and while
the Attorney General retains supervisory control, the degree of control remains
uncertain.90 It is clear, however, that the Attorney General helps define policy
priorities for DOJ, participates in formulating proposed legislation relating to
the justice system, submits budgetary requests, and assists in selecting and
screening judicial nominees.91 The Attorney General is also a member of the
cabinet, advising on policy matters that do not directly relate to the
administration of justice.92 In short, the Attorney General is prosecutor,
litigator, legal advisor, political advisor, and administrator. But as a matter of
practice, the Attorney General is not involved in the direct supervision of much
of this work.
Part of the difficulty in defining the role is that the Attorney General has
multiple responsibilities, each requiring a different sort of relationship with
other officials within the executive branch. The Attorney General is the chief
89. In this respect the Attorney General is like a lawyer for a corporation. His client is the abstract
entity, not any individual within that entity. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2019) (explaining the role of corporate lawyers). But as long as the duly authorized
representatives are serving a fiduciary role, the Attorney General can defer to their priorities and
decisions. The President has the obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, and other
administration officials swear to uphold the Constitution. Insofar as any individual betrays his or her
obligation, the Attorney General ceases to have such a duty to abide by their decisions. Cf. id. r. 1.13(b).
90. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.5(a) (2019); see also 28 U.S.C. § 509 (2018) (noting that with some
exceptions all functions of officers of DOJ are vested in the Attorney General); id. § 519 (noting that
the Attorney General supervises litigation in which the United States is a party and directs United
States Attorneys and Assistant United States Attorneys); id. § 541 (giving the President power to
appoint and remove United States Attorneys); id. § 542 (giving the Attorney General the power to
appoint and remove Assistant United States Attorneys). For a discussion of the practical independence
of United States Attorneys from the Attorney General, despite these provisions, see Ross E. Weiner,
Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86
MINN. L. REV. 363, 380–85 (2001).
91. See Organization, Mission & Functions Manual: Attorney General, Deputy and Associate, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (Sept. 9, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functionsmanual-attorney-general [https://perma.cc/L6K3-J2TU].
92. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 19; see also The Cabinet, WHITE HOUSE,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-trump-administration/the-cabinet/ [https://perma.cc/ZN8W-D938]
(listing cabinet members and including Attorney General William Barr).
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law enforcer of the United States.93 In that role, he supervises federal
prosecutions.94 Given his formal control over United States Attorneys in the
Criminal Division, the Attorney General possesses the ultimate discretion in
prosecution, a vast power.95 In this role, the Attorney General does not have a
typical client but instead represents the United States’ interests in court.96 As a
practical matter, the work of criminal prosecution is done by United States
Attorneys and their subordinates. The Attorney General also oversees lawyers
for agencies in civil cases in which the United States is a party, as well as other
civil cases like habeas and civil rights actions.97
The Attorney General also appears as amicus in cases in which the country
has an interest.98 A central part of his job is supervising the work of lawyers who
give opinions to the administration or other departments on the legality of their
actions.99
The Attorney General, however, also is a cabinet member and head of a
large and important executive branch department.100 He is appointed by the
President, with the advice and approval of the Senate, serves at the President’s
pleasure, and is removable by the President for any reason.101 The relationship
between the President and the Attorney General is the subject of debate.
Proponents of the “unitary executive” theory suggest that the President, as chief
law enforcement officer, has full control over the Attorney General and the
DOJ, while others argue that the President’s control is limited to the powers to
hire and fire the Attorney General and other officials within DOJ and to issue
pardons.102

91.

93. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 2.
94. See Organization, Mission & Functions Manual: Attorney General, Deputy and Associate, supra note
95. The literature on the broad scope of prosecutorial discretion is vast. See generally ANGELA J.
DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007) (discussing the
scope of the American prosecutor’s power and the potential for abuse). In reality, the Attorney General
delegates a great deal to United States Attorneys, who enjoy a substantial degree of independence. See
Beale, supra note 72, at 370–72 (arguing for even greater insulation for United States Attorneys from
centralized control to preserve prosecutorial neutrality).
96. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516–18 (2018).
97. See Organization, Mission & Functions Manual: Attorney General, Deputy and Associate, supra note
91.
98. See Samuel Krislov, The Role of the Attorney General as Amicus Curiae, in HUSTON ET AL.,
ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 71, 76–91 (1968).
99. See Organization, Mission & Functions Manual: Attorney General, Deputy and Associate, supra note
91.
100. See 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2018) (designating the Attorney General “the head of the Department
of Justice”).
101. See id.; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926) (holding that the President has the
sole authority and does not need congressional approval to remove executive branch officials).
102. Compare STEPHEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4 (2008) (arguing that the President has full
control over the executive branch and can assume or dictate the functions of any institution or officer
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2. The Ethical Responsibility of the Attorney General
The Attorney General must help the President fulfill his constitutional
obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”103 To do so, the
Attorney General draws on his expertise to help ensure that the people’s will,
or the policies of a particular administration, are duly reflected in legal action
and opinion, while simultaneously screening out improper partisan or political
motivations so they do not affect law enforcement decisions in individual cases
or distort legal opinion. As the head of the DOJ, the Attorney General should
seek to preserve the legitimacy of the organization so that it can function
properly. If the public lacks faith that the law is being applied in a fair and
evenhanded way, then the Attorney General has failed in that endeavor.104
Different Attorneys General have approached the job differently. Some
have been more deeply involved in politics or more intimately connected to the
President.105 Others viewed the office as a nonpartisan professional position.
Some Attorneys General have assumed their primary role was political advisor
to the President. As discussed above, after Watergate, Attorney General Griffin
Bell rejected the political nature of the role, insisting that a close or personal
connection to political actors was inappropriate because it would undermine the
legitimacy of the DOJ.106 But as Harold Tyler, former judge and Assistant
Attorney General of the United States explained, the Attorney General must
be accountable to the President so that the broad policy implications of his
office’s work—like civil rights, antitrust, immigration, and criminal
enforcement priorities—are responsive to an elected official’s mandate.107 One
historian concluded that the difficult questions concerning the nature of the
Attorney General’s responsibilities have plagued the country since its
inception.108
within it), with Green & Roiphe, Can the President Control, supra note 24, at 4–5 (arguing that our
constitutional and statutory scheme allows the President only to hire and fire the Attorney General,
not to control individual prosecutorial decisions).
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
104. Cf. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 382 (Talcott
Parsons ed., A.M. Henderson & Talcott Parsons trans., 1964) (“[T]he basis of every system of
authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue of
which persons exercising authority are lent prestige.”).
105. Luther A. Huston, History of the Office of the Attorney General, in HUSTON ET AL., supra note
98, at 1, 33. For a list of the Attorneys General and an assessment of their partisan or independent
nature, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Professionals, Politicos, and Crony Attorneys General: A Historical
Sketch of the U.S. Attorney General as a Case for Structural Independence, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965,
1967–71 (2019).
106. Attorney Gen. Griffin B. Bell, Address Before the Los Angeles County Bar Association 9
(Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Bell, Address Before the L.A. County Bar], https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/12-07-1978b.pdf [https://perma.cc/P2YY-4H7G].
107. Harold R. Tyler, Jr., The Attorney General of the United States—Counsel to the President or to the
Government?, 45 ALB. L. REV. 1, 7 (1980).
108. See Bloch, supra note 27, at 562.
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Part of the difficulty in determining the role of the Attorney General is
identifying his client. Many Attorneys General suggest that they represent the
United States, the public writ large. At least one has argued that his client is
the President. President Carter’s Attorney General, Stuart Eizenstat,
explained, “The attorney general’s client is the president. After giving his
advice, the attorney general must support the president’s policies. The
department should not act as an impartial court but should advocate the legality
of the president’s decision within the bounds of responsible and honest
argument.”109 The variety of views about the role and the nature of the client
may be due to the lack of context in many of these broad statements. In other
words, the nature of the client and the role itself depend on the particular
function the Attorney General exercises. Eizenstat, here, was focused on the
Attorney General’s role in civil suits, and in this capacity, as I argue below, it is
appropriate for the Attorney General, for the most part, to defer to the
administration—the agency head or, where appropriate, the President. In order
to make appropriate distinctions regarding role, which depend on the function
the Attorney General is exercising, it is most useful to define the client as the
United States, acting through its duly authorized representative, the President.
At times, the President’s interest may conflict with the client’s interest, and the
Attorney General may be required to substitute his own view about the nature
of the client’s interest for the President’s view. In exercising discretion in
criminal prosecutions, for instance, the President’s political interests are
categorically at odds with the obligation to apply the laws in a fair manner, and
so the Attorney General ought not defer to the President’s wishes. At others,
however, especially when policy priorities are critical, the Attorney General
ought to defer to the President to define the United States’ interest.110
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt may have respected the
independence of his Attorney General, Robert Jackson, who later served on the
Supreme Court, but he was willing to compromise that boundary for political
reasons. In 1941, Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act,111 which allowed the
United States to lend war supplies to Britain and other Allied nations.112 The
Act had a provision allowing it to sunset when the two Houses determined it
109. Stuart E. Eizenstat, White House and Justice Department After Watergate, 68 A.B.A. J. 175, 176
(1982). Eizenstat was, however, aware that different units within DOJ ought to be more independent
from the political branches, cautioning, “The White House should play no role in the exercise of the
attorney general’s prosecutorial discretion or conduct of individual cases—whether the target is an
obscure bank robber or a significant political figure.” Id. at 175.
110. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (noting that the
client defines the objectives of representation but the lawyer has discretion to determine the strategy
with which to implement those goals); id. r. 1.13 (discussing the obligations of lawyers who represent
abstract entities).
111. Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, Pub. L. No. 77-11, 55 Stat. 31 (1941).
112. Id. § 3(a)–(b), 55 Stat. at 31–32.
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was no longer necessary to protect the United States.113 Roosevelt concluded
that this provision unconstitutionally interfered with the process for enacting
or repealing legislation. He issued a rare, and possibly even unprecedented,
unpublished legal opinion to Jackson explaining that he planned to sign the Act
because it was necessary in an emergency situation but simultaneously
registering his opinion that the Act itself was unconstitutional.114 In the same
memo, he directed Jackson to reveal his memo concerning the
unconstitutionality of the Act at some later date, after it had been
implemented.115 Roosevelt made this request because he worried that the sunset
clause would serve as precedent for further unconstitutional diminution of
presidential power.116 He signed the law nonetheless because the sunset
provision was required in order to get the vote of some of his political
opponents.117 Thus, the only way to get the bill, which he considered urgent,
passed was to agree to what he saw as an unconstitutional requirement.118
Jackson, who had issued his own opinion approving of the dictum, subsequently
explained that he disagreed with Roosevelt’s constitutional analysis but took the
opinion, filed it, and released it as the President requested just over a decade
later.119 When Jackson explained how unorthodox it was for the President to
issue a legal opinion to the Attorney General, FDR, preoccupied by more
pressing concerns, shrugged off the challenge.120
And of course, when he wished to push the court-packing plan through in
1937, Roosevelt once again turned to the Attorney General to help him do it.
Attorney General Homer Cummings developed the plan and met secretly with
the President in planning how to implement it.121
Roosevelt’s relationship with his Attorneys General illustrates the
complexity of the Attorney General’s role. He is a legal advisor and a cabinet
member whose job is to help effectuate administration policy. He is also critical
in ensuring that the President fulfills his constitutional obligation to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed.”122 He seeks to help the President find a
lawful way to implement policy objectives, but he is also a lawyer, trained to
113. Id. § 3(c), 55 Stat. at 32.
114. Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353, 1354 (1953).
115. Id. at 1359.
116. See id. at 1355.
117. See id. at 1356–57.
118. Id. at 1356.
119. See id. at 1355, 1360.
120. See id. at 1360.
121. See William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-Packing” Plan, 1966
SUP. CT. REV. 347, 392.
122. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)
(holding that Attorneys General have broad prosecutorial discretion “because they are designated by
statute as the President’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed’”).
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analyze the law objectively. Attorneys General will, invariably, find themselves
in similar situations to Jackson since they are cabinet members who have a
policy as well as a legal role. Walling the Attorney General off from the
President completely would do the nation a disservice. It would make it such
that the President could distance himself from legal conclusions, criticize them,
and possibly even ignore them. This, in turn, would leave no elected official
fully responsible for often-momentous decisions.123 But if the Attorney General
is to work so closely with the President who appointed him, we can’t fully expect
a neutral performance of the job.
Given this complexity and the importance of maintaining the proper
balance between responsiveness and independence, a central part of the
Attorney General’s job is to determine when political considerations are
appropriate in DOJ work and when to screen them out.124 As President Trump’s
Attorney General Bill Barr said at his confirmation hearing, “I’m in a position
in life where I can provide the leadership necessary to protect the independence
and reputation of the department.”125 The Attorney General is the focus of
political pressure from within the executive branch, Congress, and the public,
tasked with absorbing that pressure without allowing it to inappropriately affect
the work of his office.126 Barr claimed that his lack of further political aspiration
as well as his investment in professional reputation and legacy would ensure
that he would live up to this expectation.
While consulting the President on policy and political concerns
appropriately aids in setting policy objectives and priorities, the
administration’s political agenda should not affect the work of lawyers within
DOJ in individual enforcement cases nor should it dictate legal interpretations.
While supervising the office in its nonpartisan enforcement efforts, for
instance, such considerations ought to have no role. As a 1977 memorandum
from the Attorney General put it: “His is the difficult task of separating the
different factors that might properly be considered in his role as policy adviser
from those relevant to his duties as the chief legal officer of the Government.”127
123. President Trump at times distances himself from DOJ decisions despite his power to hire and
fire the Attorney General for any reason. See, e.g., Catherine Lucey, Trump Blames ‘Jeff Sessions Justice
Department’ for Hurting GOP in Midterms, USA TODAY (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/2018/09/03/twitter-trump-attacks-sessions-suggests-doj-hurt-gop-midterms/1187203002/
[https://perma.cc/HU2W-26Q2]. This troubling development, which potentially allows him to avoid
political accountability, would be worse if DOJ were an independent agency.
124. See Role of the Solicitor Gen., 1 Op. O.L.C. 228, 232 (1977).
125. Matt Zapotosky et al., Barr Fields Questions on Mueller Probe, Independence from Trump at
Attorney General Confirmation Hearing, WASH. POST (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/barr-confirmation-hearing-trumps-attorney-general-nominee-likely-to-facetough-questioning-today-from-senate-panel/2019/01/15/02467a16-15e0-11e9-803c4ef28312c8b9_story.html [https://perma.cc/8ZQ2-49MH (dark archive)].
126. See Role of the Solicitor Gen., 1 Op. O.L.C. at 232–33.
127. Id. at 232.
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Thus, a central part of the Attorney General’s job is to communicate the
important policy considerations of the administration to his office and
simultaneously shield the DOJ lawyers whose job it is to administer the law
impartially from partisan influence.
A critical question is: Who is the Attorney General’s client? The Supreme
Court in United States v. Providence Journal Co.128 rejected the view that the
Attorney General represents the executive branch, explaining, “This suggested
interpretation of § 518(a) . . . presumes that there is more than one ‘United
States’ that may appear before this Court, and that the United States is
something other than ‘the sovereign composed of the three branches . . . .’”129
The Court justified its conclusion:
Among the reasons for reserving litigation in this Court to the Attorney
General and the Solicitor General, is the concern that the United States
usually should speak with one voice before this Court, and with a voice
that reflects not the parochial interests of a particular agency, but the
common interests of the Government and therefore of all the people.130
This passage urges the Attorney General or DOJ itself to develop this voice. If
it is not the voice of the Executive, speaking through the President, then it
seems something closer to the abstract public interest that prosecutors generally
serve. It is possibly more accurate to suggest that the Attorney General has
different clients depending on which hat he wears. As the Supreme Court held,
in representing the United States’ interests before the Supreme Court, the
client is the government as a whole.131 As a supervisor to federal prosecutors,
the client is clearly also the United States, the public in a broad sense. But in
other contexts, like civil litigators serving agency interests, the client is more
narrowly defined, as discussed below. It is this complexity that characterizes the
Attorney General’s job and defines his responsibility. The Attorney General
must facilitate appropriate administration priorities reaching all levels of DOJ,
while carefully screening partisan or political considerations from individual law
enforcement decisions and the orderly development of the law through legal
opinions and the representation of the United States’ interest in the Supreme
Court.

128. 485 U.S. 693 (1988).
129. Id. at 701 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974)).
130. Id. at 706; see also 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (2018). The contemporary statute was based on and is
virtually identical to section 35 of the Judiciary Act. Compare Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat.
73, 92, with 28 U.S.C. § 518(a).
131. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. at 701.
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Civil Division Attorneys

The next level in the continuum from the politically responsive DOJ role
to the fully independent government lawyer is civil litigation because the
lawyer’s role in this context is, in large part, to effectuate agency agendas. While
scholars disagree on this point,132 this section argues that DOJ Civil Division,
with a few notable exceptions, is involved in a different sort of government legal
work in which independence would compromise rather than advance the overall
identity of the DOJ as part of the administration with independent obligations
to be fair and evenhanded in its interpretation and enforcement of the law. As
stated above, the decision to centralize the legal work in the DOJ was not
motivated by a desire to strip agency heads of representation but rather to
ensure uniformity and eliminate improper political pressure.133 Construing civil
division attorneys in most cases as advocates for agency heads with the same
duty of independence as private civil litigators ensures this end.
1. The Role of Civil Division Attorneys
When the Justice Department was formed in 1870, Congress clarified the
role of DOJ lawyers, mandating that they have exclusive power to bring or
defend lawsuits on behalf of the government.134 The goal of the statute was, in
large part, to reduce expenses by eliminating outside private counsel and to
rationalize and professionalize the legal work of government agencies.135
Through a series of regulations, the Attorney General has delegated
responsibility for civil cases to the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil
Division.136 The United States Attorneys in the Civil Division field offices
conduct most of the litigation on behalf of the government.137 The DOJ also has

132. Compare Green, Must Government Lawyers, supra note 8, at 267–68 (arguing that federal civil
litigators owe an obligation to the public interest), with Miller, supra note 8, at 1294, 1296 n.7 (arguing
that federal civil litigators represent the relevant public official, not the public interest writ large).
133. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
134. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 5, 16 Stat. 162, 162–63. The contemporary role of DOJ with
regard to litigation is codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519 (2018), which states that only DOJ lawyers,
supervised by the Attorney General, can represent the government in litigation. Courts have elaborated
on this exclusive responsibility. See, e.g., The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454, 457–58 (1868)
(holding that district attorneys are under the direction of the Attorney General); Sutherland v. Int’l
Ins. Co. of N.Y., 43 F.2d 969, 970–71 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding that absent a statute giving explicit
authorization, only DOJ lawyers supervised by the Attorney General can bring lawsuits on behalf of
the United States).
135. For a history of the formation of DOJ, see Green & Roiphe, Can the President Control, supra
note 24, at 38–55.
136. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.45 (2019); JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 4-1.200.
137. Essentially, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division has redelegated
responsibility for these cases to the United States Attorneys. See JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, §§ 41.300, 4-1.310, 4-1.511. In most of the cases, the United States Attorneys have full authority to conduct
the litigation, including to settle cases, without approval from the Assistant Attorney General for the
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specific units for some areas of litigation, namely the Torts Branch, Commercial
Litigation Branch, Federal Programs Branch, Office of Immigration Litigation,
Office of Consumer Litigation, and the Appellate Staff, each of which is run by
a Deputy Assistant Attorney General.138
When the federal government is not a party to a case but has an interest
in the outcome, the Civil Division may file an amicus curiae brief.139 This arises
most frequently when the court, in resolving private parties’ claims, will
interpret a federal statute or agency regulation.140 If the constitutionality of an
act is in question, the court must certify the issue to the Attorney General,141
and if a United States Attorney’s Office is involved in such a case, it too must
notify the Civil Division of DOJ.142
While agencies are designated as clients, the Attorney General retains
control over the terms of settlement,143 and only DOJ attorneys are allowed to
appear in court.144 Because the agencies are often in the best position to know
and obtain the facts pertaining to litigation, they are responsible for creating
litigation holds where appropriate,145 drafting responses to complaints, and
developing reports with relevant information about agency regulations, policies,
and other facts that might bear on the litigation.146 As the trial nears, the agency
continues to have responsibilities with regard to facts, such as providing draft
responses to interrogatories and other information necessary to comply with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.147 Just as private attorneys have an obligation
to communicate with their clients, United States Attorneys in civil litigation
are required to keep agencies informed about the cases.148
That said, not all civil division work is so clearly the work of advocacy.
The Civil Division is also responsible for habeas petitions.149 While technically
a civil proceeding, habeas proceedings are a collateral challenge to criminal
convictions and involve constitutional criminal issues. In civil rights claims, the
government is serving an enforcement role as it does in prosecution. The

Civil Division. Id. § 4-1.312. The Justice Manual lays out the kinds of cases that may not be delegated
to the United States Attorney Offices and must be handled directly by central DOJ. Id. § 4-1.313.
138. Id. § 4-1.210.
139. Id. § 4-1.323.
140. See id.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2018).
142. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 4-1.324.
143. See FTC v. Guignon, 390 F.2d 323, 324 (8th Cir. 1968).
144. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 4-1.420.
145. Id. § 4-1.431.
146. Id. § 4-1.432.
147. Id. § 4-1.433.
148. Id. § 4-1.520.
149. See Green, Must Government Lawyers, supra note 8, at 243.
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government is acting to enforce its laws rather than as a private party would in
litigation.150
2. The Ethical Responsibility of Civil Division Attorneys
The ethical responsibility of federal civil litigators is controversial. Some
argue that, as government lawyers, civil litigators, just like prosecutors, owe
responsibility to the public and as such have a duty to do justice.151 Others insist
that DOJ lawyers conducting civil litigation serve the relevant agency through
the appointed agency head.152
Federal prosecutors, as explained below, have a duty to do justice.153 They
are responsible not only for legal work, but like all public officials, they also
define what the public interest is in any given instance without deference to any
elected official’s view. Private lawyers, on the other hand, represent their
clients’ interests zealously.154 Of course, ethical rules make clear that zeal should
be tempered by specific obligations to the law and the legal system, but the
standard view of lawyering is that private lawyers, unlike prosecutors, seek to
carry out their clients’ objectives without regard to the justness of the cause.155
This standard conception of a lawyer’s role reasons that private lawyers are not
implicated in the morality of their clients’ positions because representing a
client does not constitute an endorsement of that client’s view.156 The rationale
for this standard view of lawyering is that the legal system itself is designed to
resolve moral and practical differences and mediate between private interests.
As such, lawyers should not impose a particular view on their clients but rather
make all reasonable arguments on their behalf.157 It is the obligation of the judge
or other fact finder, and not the lawyer, to determine the just outcome after
150. See id. at 246–48.
151. See id. at 238–39; see also Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and
Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 789–90 (2000); Catherine J.
Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest
Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951, 955 (1991). This view is also the one adopted by the Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 97 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
This position was embraced by Attorney General Griffin Bell in an address to DOJ lawyers in 1978.
See Bell, Address Before DOJ Lawyers, supra note 84, at 7.
152. See Miller, supra note 8, at 1296 n.7; Jeffrey Rosenthal, Who Is the Client of the Government
Lawyer?, in ETHICAL STANDARDS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A GUIDE FOR GOVERNMENT
LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS 13, 13 (Patricia E. Salkin ed., 1999). The ABA agrees
with this interpretation of the government lawyer’s role in civil litigation. See ABA Comm’n on Ethics
& Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-387 (1994).
153. See infra Section II.E.
154. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
155. Some ethics scholars argue that private attorneys have obligations to justice and morality that
go beyond the minimal requirements spelled out in the ethical rules. See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 77 (2000); David Luban, Reason and Passion
in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 873 (1999).
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b).
157. See W. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW 26 (2010).
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analyzing these arguments. Most adherents of this view of lawyering, however,
do not condone endless gamesmanship.158 A lawyer may only take reasonable
positions on behalf of his client and that obligation serves as a real limit on all
lawyers’ conduct.
The standard view of lawyering is suited, for the most part, to government
lawyers who are acting as civil litigators. While some scholars argue that
government lawyers represent the sovereignty and therefore owe a duty directly
to the public,159 this vision of lawyering has two problems. First, it is not
consistent with the history or statutory role that civil lawyers play, and second,
it undermines democratic structures and the role of law as a neutral and
legitimate way to resolve disputes.160
The history of DOJ and the role of civil litigators suggest that the client
is generally the agency.161 As the Federal Bar Association stated in 1973,
Each part of the government has the obligation of carrying out, in the
public interest, its assigned responsibility in a manner consistent with
the Constitution, and the applicable laws and regulations. In contrast,
the private practitioner represents the client’s personal or private
interest. In pointing out that the federally employed lawyer thus is
engaged professionally in the furtherance of a particular governmental
responsibility we do not suggest, however, that the public is the client as
the client concept is usually understood. It is to say that the lawyer’s
employment requires him to observe in the performance of his
professional responsibility the public interest sought to be served by the
governmental organization of which he is a part.162
To be sure, the client agency does not have as much control over the lawyer’s
work as a private client would. For instance, a private client decides whether to
158. See, e.g., id. at 49.
159. See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 151, at 790–802; Green, Must Government Lawyers, supra note 8,
at 265–70.
160. See WENDEL, supra note 157, at 49.
161. This is also the position of the Federal Bar Association (“FBA”). In 1973, the FBA offered
ethical considerations to supplement the ABA’s Model Code of Professional Responsibility, stating that the
government lawyer’s client “is the agency where he is employed, including those charged with its
administration insofar as they are engaged in the conduct of the public business.” Fed. Bar Ass’n Prof’l
Ethics Comm., Ethics Opinion 73-1: The Government Client and Confidentiality, 32 FED. B.J. 71, 72 (1973).
In an opinion, the FBA elaborated that the immediate professional responsibility of the federal lawyer
is to the department or agency in which he is employed, to be performed in light of the particular
public interest function of the department or agency. See id. Attorney General Griffin Bell also
described agencies as clients of DOJ lawyers. See Bell, Address Before the L.A. County Bar, supra note
106, at 13. There are times when the private litigation involves significant administration policies and
the President might step in to supervise the agency head’s interpretation of national interest. See
Eizenstat, supra note 109, at 176 (listing litigation concerning the legality of oil import fees and the
constitutionality of the legislative veto as two such instances that arose during the Carter
administration).
162. Fed. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., supra note 161, at 72.
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settle a case,163 while DOJ lawyers make that determination on behalf of the
agency.164 The reason for this difference, as supported by the history of the law
department and government legal work, is not that the government lawyer has
a direct obligation to the public but rather to maintain uniformity in the
government’s approach to legal questions. The division of authority is
analogous to private entity clients, where some decisions will be left to the
general counsel’s office rather than specific departments to create a uniform and
rational approach to the corporation’s legal work. In other words, the DOJ was
not created to deprive agencies of counsel but rather to centralize lawyers in one
department in order to maintain uniformity and efficiency in the government’s
legal representation.
More importantly, the standard view of lawyering for government
attorneys is more consistent with the goal to preserve legal institutions as a
neutral mechanism to resolve disputes. Assessing the public interest in the
abstract is difficult. Allowing government lawyers to do so introduces a risk or
at least a legitimate concern that the lawyer is merely drawing on her own
political or personal moral view. Of course, the same concern can and has been
leveled at federal prosecutors,165 but at least the DOJ and the bar have sought
to develop guidelines, procedures, and limits for prosecutors. The effort to weed
partisan political motivation out of prosecutorial decisionmaking is imperative
because individual liberty is at stake. The concern is not as great and arguably
lacking entirely in civil lawsuits.
While the “public interest” is a vague notion, the Constitution provides a
way to approximate it through processes like election, appointment,
confirmation, and legislation. For federal prosecutors, none of these
mechanisms works entirely, in part because prosecutors are asked to exercise
substantial discretion and are required to operate in a disinterested way. They
must be insulated both from politicians and the public in order to ensure that
they apply the law in a fair and evenhanded way. While all lawyers ought to be,
in a sense, independent of their clients to ensure the legality of their clients’
actions as well as the propriety of the means of achieving their goals, the need
for insulation is not as strong for civil lawyers because life and liberty are not at
stake.

163. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019).
164. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 4-1.312.
165. See generally Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58
B.C. L. REV. 463, 471 (2017) [hereinafter Green & Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts] (arguing
that the duty to do justice requires impartiality); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial
Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837 [hereinafter Green & Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality] (explaining
the various meanings of prosecutorial neutrality and emphasizing that it involves something other than
the personal idiosyncratic view of the individual prosecutor).

98 N.C. L. REV. 1077 (2020)

1104

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

Furthermore, the idea that government lawyers ought to seek justice in
civil cases fails to situate these lawyers within the structure of democratic
government. While pursuing an abstract notion of justice may be suited to
criminal cases where the stakes are so high, the Constitution otherwise provides
for a system of elected and appointed officials to determine what that interest
is when it comes to litigation. The relevant agency assesses what it believes to
be in the public interest as defined broadly by the legislature. A private citizen
or other plaintiff may challenge that understanding and the court will determine
the outcome. A government civil litigator serves the public interest best by
advocating for the agency and allowing the judicial system to sort out its
meaning.166
That said, even in the standard view of lawyering, no lawyer is permitted
to make absurd legal arguments in pursuit of his client’s goal.167 If an argument
is frivolous, the lawyer is barred from making it.168 If it is not frivolous but is
unreasonable, the lawyer can refuse to make the argument on behalf of the
client.169 Given lawyers’ role in preserving the administration of justice, a
private lawyer should not make an absurd or unreasonable argument. Nor
should a government lawyer do so in pursuing an agency interest in civil
litigation.
There are situations in which civil division lawyers are acting more like
prosecutors than like private litigators. If they are not litigating a case but are
instead acting as law enforcement lawyers would, then they may have an
obligation to do justice or to act more generally in the public interest. For
instance, when a lawyer is arguing a habeas case or bringing a civil rights law
enforcement action, that lawyer may have a more direct obligation to the public
than a lawyer who is serving to effect the interest of the public, as defined by a
particular agency, in civil litigation.170 This is so because the lawyer’s work looks
more like a prosecutor’s work, and for the reasons explained below, in making
decisions in individual cases like these, prosecutors must be independent from
all partisan and political influence.

166. Some have argued that the government lawyer serves the interest of the government as a
whole, not a particular agency. See, e.g., Lanctot, supra note 151, at 955. Geoffrey Miller argues against
this position by pointing out that the constitutional system of checks and balances requires each branch
have a way to protect itself against encroachment of the others and that lawyers serve this role. Miller,
supra note 8, at 1296. Their ability to do so would be undermined if all government lawyers served all
three branches at once. See id.
167. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.2(c), 3.1.
168. Id. r. 3.1.
169. See id. r. 1.2(c); see also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753–54 (1983) (holding that it is not
ineffective assistance of counsel and is in fact good lawyering to refuse to raise all the arguments a
client wishes to make).
170. See Green, Must Government Lawyers, supra note 8, at 243–48.
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The Solicitor General
1. The Role of the Solicitor General

The office of the Solicitor General was created in 1870 along with the DOJ
itself. The statute provided that there should be “an officer learned in the law,
to assist the Attorney-General in the performance of his duties, to be called the
solicitor-general.”171 He would also be responsible for arguing any cases in which
the government has an interest.172 It is significant that the 1870 Act used the
phrase “learned in the law,” which initially described the office of the Attorney
General, to describe the post of the Solicitor General. The Attorney General
has delegated several of his duties such that the Solicitor General has
responsibility for conducting all Supreme Court cases, determining whether
appeals should be taken, advising on the approval of settlements when an appeal
would be inappropriate, determining when to intervene and whether to file an
amicus curiae brief, and assisting the Attorney General in devising DOJ
policy.173 The use of “learned in the law” to modify the Solicitor General may
have reflected a conscious acknowledgement that the Attorney General is, in
part, a political position. As the quasi-judicial responsibilities migrated to other
lawyers within DOJ, the Attorney General was free to assume a more political
role as cabinet member and serve as a filter to ensure that only proper political
priorities affect DOJ’s work.
The Solicitor General has historically been seen as a legal position,
detached from the political branches. Until 1952, the Solicitor General served
as the second ranking official in the DOJ and would serve as acting Attorney
General if need be.174 The Solicitor General has offices in the Supreme Court
in addition to the DOJ, and many refer to the role as the “Tenth Justice.”175
Commentators have interpreted this to mean that the Solicitor General has an
obligation to the law, that the normal rules of zealous advocacy and deference
to the client’s wishes do not pertain, at least insofar as the client is an elected or
appointed official.176
171. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 2, 16 Stat. 162, 162.
172. Id. § 5, 16 Stat. at 162–63.
173. 28 C.F.R. § 0.20 (2019).
174. HUSTON, supra note 23, at 59.
175. LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF
LAW 3 (1987).
176. See id.; Kathryn Mickle Werdegar, The Solicitor General and Administrative Due Process: A
Quarter Century of Advocacy, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 481, 482 (1968). There are some notable
dissenters who argue that the Solicitor General’s obligation is to the President, not to the Court. See,
e.g., John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The Solicitor General’s Office in Constitutional and
Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REV. 799, 802 (1992) (arguing that “the Solicitor General is not
independent” of the President but ought to be “wholly independent” of the Court). McGinnis’s account
derives from a unitary theory of the Executive and, while compelling if one accepts the premise, is
inconsistent with the historical development of the position.
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2. The Ethical Responsibility of the Solicitor General
The President has the obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully
executed and the Attorney General, like all government lawyers, takes an oath
to uphold the Constitution. The Solicitor General helps both the President and
the Attorney General put the law above policy considerations. Attorney
General Francis Biddle wrote that the Solicitor General
determines what cases to appeal, and the client has no say in the matter,
he does what his lawyer tells him, the lawyer stands in his client’s shoes,
for the client is but an abstraction. He is responsible neither to the man
who appointed him nor to his immediate superior in the hierarchy of
administration. The total responsibility is his, and his guide is only the
ethic of his own profession framed in the ambience of his experience and
judgment.177
The Solicitor General is independent from the administration and agencies for
three reasons. First, this independence helps ensure uniformity before the
Supreme Court. Different agencies may have different positions and conflicting
interests, but the United States needs to speak with one voice once it reaches
the highest court.178 The law needs to develop in an orderly way despite shifts
in political and ideological stances in the administration. Second, the Solicitor
General is seen as an adjunct of the Court, drawing on professional legal
expertise to assist it in its function. As such, he helps ensure the development
of the law by choosing when to seek review and when it might be better to allow
the lower courts to grapple with an issue.179 Third, as with prosecutors,
independence assures that improper considerations do not affect the Solicitor
General’s decisions and arguments.180
The Solicitor General’s role as “tenth justice” perhaps reflects the original
conception, articulated in the first draft of the Judiciary Act, of the Attorney
General as a judicial role.181 While the final version abandoned the judiciary’s
control over the Attorney General, that notion of the government lawyer as a
quasi-judicial actor may have migrated from the Attorney General to the
Solicitor General when the position was created in 1870. This hypothesis makes
sense, especially given that the statute that created DOJ and the Solicitor
General described the Solicitor General as “learned in the law,” a phrase that
had modified the Attorney General in the Judiciary Act.182

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 97 (1962).
See Role of the Solicitor Gen., 1 Op. O.L.C. 228, 230 (1977).
See id. at 231.
See id.
See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93.
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But the simplicity of the term “tenth justice” is deceiving. Independence
does not require or even counsel isolation. Like any lawyer, the Solicitor
General needs to be informed, and to do so he has to consult not only with the
administration but with any agency involved in the case.183 At times, a legal
issue is so tied up with a policy one that independence must give way. If policy
is central to the proper determination of a legal position, then a Solicitor
General can and should defer to the administration.184
The Solicitor General represents the United States government, not the
administration. As Solicitor General Erwin Griswold argued in 1969:
The Solicitor General’s client in a particular case cannot be properly
represented before the Supreme Court except from a broad point of
view, taking into account all of the factors which affect sound
government and the proper formulation and development of the law. In
providing for the Solicitor General, subject to the direction of the
Attorney General, to attend to the “interests of the United States” in
litigation, the statutes have always been understood to mean the longrange interests of the United States, not simply in terms of its fisc, or its
success in the particular litigation, but as a government, as a people.185
In Griswold and Biddle’s view, the Solicitor General represents the
government, not a particular administration. He owes his obligation to the
public in the sense that the public has a long-term interest in the orderly
development of the law. The President has the obligation to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,”186 and the Solicitor General is critical to that
mission.
Some might frame the Solicitor General’s responsibility as a “duty to do
justice” much like prosecutors’.187 Philip Elman, an Assistant Solicitor General
from 1944 to 1961, took this view. Elman, who had been a clerk to Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter, worked on civil rights cases throughout his
tenure at DOJ and is known for having written the brief for Brown v. Board of
Education.188 He explained, “[W]e took it for granted, without making any big
fuss over it or being self-righteous, that our job was to do justice . . . .”189 In the
months leading up to the case, Elman was in constant contact with Justice
Frankfurter, who told Elman his views and that of the other justices.190 While
183. See Role of the Solicitor Gen., 1 Op. O.L.C. at 234.
184. See id. at 235.
185. Erwin N. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General—Representing the Interests of the United
States Before the Supreme Court, 34 MO. L. REV. 527, 535 (1969).
186. U.S. CONST. art II, § 3.
187. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors
Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 60–65 (1991).
188. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
189. CAPLAN, supra note 175, at 25.
190. See id. at 25–26.
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Elman acknowledged the potential ethical problems with this collaboration, he
defended himself by arguing that he was not really representing a client: “I
didn’t consider myself a lawyer for a litigant. I considered it a cause that
transcended ordinary notions about propriety in a litigation.”191 He went on to
explain how exceptional Brown v. Board of Education was, but it is nonetheless
striking that he considered himself a “junior partner, or law clerk emeritus” of
the Court, blurring professional and intrabranch roles.192
Elman’s vision, derived from a view of the Solicitor General as directly
responsible to the abstract notion of justice and not to a client or political actor,
is both extreme and dangerous. At the very least, Elman’s cozy relationship with
Frankfurter gave him an unfair advantage and deprived the private party of its
right to rebut the government’s position.193 Even a prosecutor’s duty to do
justice is constrained by his client more than this particular vision of the
Solicitor General’s job.
It would be wiser, perhaps, to take the more modest position that the
Solicitor General has a client who is a party to a litigation. He is a lawyer for a
client, with a special obligation. The executive branch has an interest and
constitutional obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. The
Solicitor General represents the public in its abstract and long-term interest in
the proper development of the federal law.194 He carries out this function
independently, not because he is an adjunct of the Court but to ensure that the
interests of a given administration do not do a disservice to the law.
Erwin Griswold, who was Solicitor General under Lyndon Johnson and
Richard Nixon, understood the Solicitor General’s independence in this way.
For instance, he privately insisted that the administration was wrong in suing
newspapers for printing the Pentagon Papers, the stolen Defense Department
study revealing that multiple administrations had lied to the American public
about the Vietnam War.195 But when Griswold drafted his brief in support of
the government’s position, he took the administration’s opposite view.196 In the
draft cases, however, Griswold refused to advance the government’s position
because he thought it extremely unlikely to prevail given Supreme Court
precedent and sensed that he would lose credibility with the Court if he were
to argue the case as the administration wished.197 In the end, the government
defended the draft board, but the brief was signed by the Attorney General
191. Id. at 30.
192. Id.
193. See id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019)
(prohibiting lawyers from having ex parte contact with judges unless it is authorized by law).
194. This vision of the Solicitor General’s role draws on fiduciary theories of government. See, e.g.,
Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 516–17 (2015).
195. CAPLAN, supra note 175, at 34.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 34–35.
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instead of Griswold, perhaps signaling to the Court that this was more of a
political than a legal stance.198 Griswold’s record reflects a sense of obligation to
the public to be faithful to the law but at the same time a deference to the
administration when it would not undermine such orderly development of the
law.
The Solicitor General’s independent role encountered one of its greatest
tests when the constitutionality of affirmative action reached the Supreme
Court during the Carter administration. In Regents of the University of California
v. Bakke,199 a man who had received a relatively high score on the entrance
examination was refused admission to medical school and argued that the
affirmative action program denied his constitutional right to equal protection.200
Initially, the federal government took no position because it was not a party to
the litigation, but two Assistant Solicitors General who were strongly opposed
to affirmative action drafted a brief in favor of Bakke, which was leaked to the
New York Times.201 Solicitor General Wade McCree then enlisted the
President’s support for a brief in support of the affirmative action program.202
This was seen as a bad test case, because it involved strict racial quotas, but
President Carter felt strongly that the brief serve as a pronouncement of the
administration’s commitment to affirmative action.203 Carter’s personal
attorney and chief advisor for domestic policy ended up having a strong say in
the tone of the brief. Attorney General Griffin Bell criticized the administration
for interfering. According to Bell, instead of taking instruction from the
administration, the Solicitor General should have determined what the law
allowed and then presented his analysis to the administration.204
In 1977, the Office of Legal Counsel published a memorandum, signed by
Assistant Attorney General John Harmon, regarding the role of Solicitor
General.205 The memo explained that the Solicitor General enjoys substantial
independence both within the DOJ and from political actors. While technically
the Solicitor General reports directly to the Attorney General like the Assistant
Attorneys General, as a matter of tradition, the Attorney General respects the
independence of the office.206 As the direct link and advisor to the President,

198. See Robert E. Keeton, Book Review, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1386, 1396–97 (1992).
199. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
200. Id. at 269–72.
201. See CAPLAN, supra note 175, at 42–43.
202. See GRIFFIN B. BELL WITH RONALD J. OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 29–32
(1982); JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., GOVERNING AMERICA 241 (1981); CAPLAN, supra note 175, at 43–
47; JOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY
166–71 (1979).
203. See CAPLAN, supra note 175, at 42–44.
204. See id. at 45–48.
205. Role of the Solicitor Gen., 1 Op. O.L.C. 228 (1977).
206. See id. at 229–30.
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the Attorney General is in part and inevitably a political actor. To preserve the
Solicitor General’s more neutral role, Harmon articulated this norm of relative
independence within DOJ. He further explained that the Solicitor General is
also insulated from other executive officials. He can refuse to advance their
arguments, confess error without permission, and decline to seek certiorari even
if the relevant elected or appointed official disagrees.207 The memo gives four
reasons for the independent role. First, it is necessary to preserve uniformity in
the government’s legal position.208 Second, as an officer of the court, the
Solicitor General has an obligation to help it carry out its function.209 Third, he
has a role to play in preserving the orderly growth of the law.210 And finally,
independence prevents improper considerations from intruding on the
government’s presentation of the law before the Supreme Court.211
Harmon justified the Solicitor General’s independence from the Attorney
General. In theory the Attorney General is also charged with administering the
law in an independent way, but because he serves as a member of the President’s
cabinet, in reality, it is hard to screen out partisan concerns entirely.212 Thus,
there is a need to create some distance between the two roles. The memo,
echoing Bell’s criticism of the handling of the Bakke case, suggests that the
Solicitor General ought to formulate his own views about potential litigation
before consulting the Attorney General or anyone in the administration.213 In
developing his legal opinion, however, the Solicitor General should be
encouraged to speak to executive officials who may have information or a
perspective that bears on his judgment.214 According to the memorandum, after
being presented with the opinion, in most cases the President and Attorney
General should accept that view. Only in extraordinary circumstances would it
be appropriate for them to override the Solicitor General’s professional opinion.
The final decision belongs to the Attorney General and the President, but in all
but a few rare and extraordinary instances they should defer to the Solicitor
General.215 The deference ensures the integrity of the President’s constitutional
obligation, which has been assumed by the Solicitor General, to take care that
the laws are executed faithfully, without improper influence.216
The policy designed to protect the Solicitor General’s independence may
be wise, but more importantly, Harmon states a position that seems consistent
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id. at 229–31.
See id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 232.
See id. at 233.
See id. at 233–34.
See id.
Id. at 234.
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with those that came before. The Solicitor General has an obligation to the law
and the courts. His decisions, while not completely inattentive to the
administration’s goals, ought to operate independently of them. This does not
answer the question posed above about whether the Solicitor General ought to
draw on court decisions in his interpretation of the law or whether he ought to
develop an independent executive branch interpretation. Given the dearth of
precedent for executive interpretation, it seems wise for a Solicitor General to
at least draw on judicial precedent in developing an understanding of the law.
D.

The Office of Legal Counsel

The 1789 Judiciary Act assigned the Attorney General the central function
of providing opinions on legal matters.217 The President is obligated to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed, which requires that he first understand
what the law means.218 Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) opinions affect not
only government agencies but also private individuals who have claims or
concerns with the government. Because they don’t always have a mechanism
for bringing these concerns before a court, OLC’s opinions are often definitive
and ought to be neutral as a result, or as Attorney General Caleb Cushing put
it in 1856, “quasi judicial.”219
1. The Role of Office of Legal Counsel Lawyers
The Assistant Attorney General in charge of OLC is sometimes described
as “the Attorney General’s lawyer.”220 OLC prepares formal opinions for the
Attorney General, gives formal and informal legal advice to government
agencies, and assists the Attorney General in his function as legal adviser to the
President and cabinet.221 The Office also offers formal opinions on the legality
of pending legislation and “form and legality” review of executive action.222 It
resolves legal disputes between different executive agencies223 and reviews
proposed executive orders for legality before they are sent on to the

217. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92–93.
218. See David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 113,
113–14 (1993).
219. Office & Duties of Attorney Gen., 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 334 (1854).
220. HUSTON, supra note 23, at 60.
221. Id.; see 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2019).
222. Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 338 (1993). There is some question about whether OLC should defer to
Congress once it has enacted legislation. Traditionally, DOJ did not offer opinions on the
constitutionality of enacted legislation but Ronald Reagan’s Attorney General, Edwin Meese, criticized
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, and both Meese and Attorney
General Richard Thornburgh criticized the judicial decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See
BAKER, supra note 29, at 18.
223. See Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1979), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (2018).
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President.224 The head of OLC has also historically served in a more casual role
advising Presidents about the legality of proposed or past action.225 It is also
asked to give its opinion on the constitutionality of proposed legislation.226
The standards for review of executive action are not clear. Particularly, it
is unclear whether OLC has any responsibility to review factual findings that
the President makes to support proposed executive action.227 The President is
not bound by OLC’s legal opinions. He is free not to seek legal advice or to
ignore it once he receives it.228 There remain others within the executive branch,
like agency lawyers and the White House Counsel, who can provide an
interpretation of the law, but most important legal opinions are issued by
OLC.229 Many OLC opinions have significant force of law despite the fact that
they are untested in court.230
Some believe that, as a descriptive matter, OLC’s authority and influence
declined during the Obama administration.231 At least on national security
issues, the Obama administration convened a group comprised of agency
lawyers as well as the White House Counsel to deliberate.232 While the process
could avoid error by promoting deliberation and consensus, it could potentially
diminish OLC’s independent influence in favor of decisions focused on the
White House’s interest.233 The OLC during the Obama administration also
224. See Exec. Order No. 11,030, 3 C.F.R. 219 (1962), reprinted in 44 U.S.C. § 1505 (2018).
225. See Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Change in Continuity at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 507, 508 (1993).
226. John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative,
Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 431 (1993) [hereinafter McGinnis,
Models of the Opinion Function].
227. See Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 825, 867 (2019); Annika
Lichtenbaum, “Form and Legality”: The Office of Legal Counsel’s Role in the National Emergency Declaration,
LAWFARE (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/form-and-legality-office-legal-counsels-rolenational-emergency-declaration [https://perma.cc/4N9L-UKP9].
228. BAKER, supra note 29, at 6.
229. See Jennifer Wang, Note, Raising the Stakes at the White House: Legal and Ethical Duties of the
White House Counsel, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 115, 134 (1994); Note, Rethinking the Professional
Responsibilities of Federal Agency Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1178 (2002); Jameel Jaffer, The Office
of Legal Counsel and Secret Law, JUST SECURITY (July 18, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/
43253/office-legal-counsel-secret-law/ [https://perma.cc/Y4NY-Z7MS] (emphasizing the scope and
importance of OLC’s opinions).
230. For instance, the two OLC opinions concluding that a sitting President cannot be indicted
led Special Counsel Robert Mueller not to offer an opinion about whether or not President Trump
obstructed justice. See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24
Op. O.L.C. 222, 222 (2000); Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, Amenability of the President, Vice President and Other Civil Officers to
Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office 16 (Sept. 24, 1973), https://fas.org/irp/
agency/doj/olc/092473.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9WZ-Z98L].
231. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, More on the Decline of OLC, LAWFARE (Nov. 3, 2015),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/more-decline-olc [https://perma.cc/5GAM-8WZD].
232. See id.
233. Id.
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engaged in the practice of circulating drafts of opinions, which similarly
promoted a deliberative process but also risked subjecting legal opinions to
political bargaining.234 Despite these developments that might relegate it to the
sidelines, OLC has issued a number of controversial opinions recently,
reasserting its presence in charged political debates.235
2. The Ethical Responsibility of Office of Legal Counsel Lawyers
Agencies and administrations have consistently consulted OLC in part
because its lawyers have had the reputation of being both skilled and neutral.236
According to its own guidelines, OLC is supposed to provide its “best
understanding of what the law requires” rather than a persuasive argument on
behalf of a client.237 It is supposed to “give candid, independent, and principled
advice—even when that advice is inconsistent with the aims of policymakers.”238
Since OLC derives its reputation in part from its skill and this stated
independence, it ought to be structured to promote these ends.
The problem, as Professor Shalev Roisman points out, is that this mission
is in tension with the OLC lawyers’ interest in remaining relevant and involved
in official decisionmaking.239 After all, the White House Counsel is more likely
to consult with OLC if the lawyers are compliant and supportive of proposed
executive action.240 OLC has opined recently on many controversial issues,
including the legality of President Trump’s refusal to turn over his tax
returns.241 OLC has given its blessing to the reallocation of funds to build the

234. Id.
235. See Shalev Roisman, The Real Decline of OLC, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 8, 2019),
https://www.justsecurity.org/66495/the-real-decline-of-olc/
[https://perma.cc/JG5A-EGA8]
[hereinafter Roisman, The Real Decline of OLC].
236. See id.; see also BAKER, supra note 29, at 147 (observing this same phenomenon and arguing
that the fact that the President is not required to seek legal advice or abide by the advice he is given
exacerbates the problem).
237. Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, for Attorneys of the Office, Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 1
(July 16, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/26/olc-legal-adviceopinions.pdf [https://perma.cc/P9ES-298G].
238. Id. Some have argued that this quasi-judicial position is in tension with the notion of a unitary
executive. The President necessarily loses control if DOJ lawyers have an obligation to something other
than him. See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437,
445–52 (1993) (reconciling the two by arguing that OLC simply plays the role that a private attorney
would play in counseling his client on the law).
239. See Roisman, The Real Decline of OLC, supra note 235.
240. See id.; see also BAKER, supra note 29, at 13–14 (arguing that the White House Counsel
competes with OLC by providing a source of legal advice to the President).
241. See Cong. Comm.’s Request for the President’s Tax Returns Under 26 U.S.C. § 6103(f), 43
Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 1 (June 13, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1173756/download
[https://perma.cc/WS9C-UYH3].
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border wall,242 the aggressive assertion of executive privilege,243 and, most
recently, the validity of the whistleblower complaint that led to the President’s
impeachment. With regard to the latter, OLC concluded that the President’s
request to Ukraine to investigate his political rival Joe Biden and his son did
not express an “urgent concern” under the intelligence community
whistleblower provisions and therefore need not be conveyed to Congress.244
Theoretically, the addition of White House Counsel in 1939 might have
ensured the independence of OLC by providing the President with a different
source for more politically fraught legal opinions. But it seems that the advent
of the position has, to the contrary, undermined the independence of OLC by
giving the President an additional source of legal advice, which allows him to
sideline OLC if it offers an undesired opinion on the meaning of the law. The
theory is that OLC, jealous of its own power and relevance, will offer the
opinion that the administration seeks, rather than “the best understanding of
what the law requires,” in order to remain relevant and avoid being
marginalized.
There are several possible models for OLC lawyers. Assuming that the
administration is OLC’s client, the lawyers can approach their job as advocates,
offering the best possible legal justification of a desired action and refusing to
do so only if there is no reasonable legal defense. Alternatively, OLC could take
a more judicial approach, seeking the “best” view of the law or at least the most
convincing view of law regardless of the administration’s wishes.245
Since OLC took over the Attorney General’s opinion-writing function, it
is worth exploring how early Attorneys General as well as more contemporary
ones viewed that particular aspect of their job. A number of early Attorneys
General considered their opinion-writing function as a neutral act requiring an
independent assessment of the meaning of the law. As Attorney General Caleb
Cushing wrote in 1854, “In the discharge of the [duty to provide legal opinions]
242. Lichtenbaum, supra note 227.
243. See Attempted Exclusion of Agency Counsel from Cong. Depositions of Agency Emps., 43
Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 1–3 (May 23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
opinions/attachments/2019/11/04/2019-05-23-agency-counsel-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/46HK-JZHM]
(finding that Congress “may not compel an executive branch witness to appear without agency
counsel”); Testimonial Immunity Before Cong. of the Former Counsel to the President, 43 Op.
O.L.C., slip op. at 1–2 (May 20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opinions/
attachments/2019/11/04/2019-05-20-test-immun-fmr-whc-2_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNN9-MLLE]
(finding that “Congress may not constitutionally compel the President’s senior advisers to testify about
their official duties”).
244. See “Urgent Concern” Determination by the Inspector Gen. of the Intelligence Cmty., 43
Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 1–2 (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1205711/download
[https://perma.cc/P3V5-S2GY] (interpreting 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(5) (2018)).
245. See Daphna Renan, The Law Presidents Make, 103 VA. L. REV. 805, 807–11 (2017) (arguing
that the role of OLC as a legal constraint or justification for presidential action itself is contingent on
the political priorities of the President).
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. . . the action of the Attorney General is quasi judicial. His opinions officially
define the law, in a multitude of cases . . . .”246 More contemporary Attorneys
General have echoed this view. Attorney General Griffin Bell, for instance,
wrote:
As a matter of good government, it is desirable generally that the
executive branch adopt a single, coherent position with respect to the
legal questions that arise in the process of government. Indeed, the
commitment of our government to due process of law and to equal
protection of the laws probably requires that our executive officers
proceed in accordance with a coherent, consistent interpretation of the
law, to the extent that it is administratively possible to do so. It is thus
desirable for the President to entrust the final responsibility for
interpretations of the law to a single officer or department. The Attorney
General is the one officer in the executive branch who is charged by law
with the duties of advising the others about the law and of representing
the interests of the United States in general litigation in which questions
of law arise. The task of developing a single, coherent view of the law is
entrusted to the President himself, and by delegation to the Attorney
General. That task is consistent with the nature of the office of Attorney
General.247
By centralizing the opinion-writing function within DOJ in 1870,
Congress attempted to improve efficiency and uniformity, but in doing so it
also sought to promote a more professional and neutral approach to the law. For
instance, Representative Thomas Jenckes expressed concern that lawyers within
agencies would “give advice which seems to have been instigated by the heads
of the Department.”248 Congress acted in part out of a sense that department
heads with a political agenda would influence their lawyers. It seems reasonable
to conclude that the intent behind the law creating DOJ was, at least in part, to
render this function more professional and neutral and therefore more uniform
and predictable.
The function of OLC is to serve the executive branch. As such, some argue
that it properly seeks to preserve the power of the presidency.249 This effort to
preserve the power of the Executive has been relatively consistent over time
and through administrations with different political ideologies.250 However,
OLC’s willingness to support the executive branch is not as consistent. For
instance, OLC argued that the special counsel provisions of the Ethics in

246. Office & Duties of Attorney Gen., 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 333–34 (1854).
247. Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator,
or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1068 (1978) [hereinafter Bell, The Attorney General].
248. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3036 (1870).
249. See, e.g., Alito, supra note 225, at 507.
250. Id.
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Government Act were constitutional under the Carter administration and
reversed its position when Reagan was President.251 Thus the assertion that
OLC has always served to expand and justify executive power would be
incorrect.
Scholars have identified three possible models for OLC lawyers. First,
they could approach a legal question by attempting to predict how courts would
resolve a problem.252 Second, they could do an independent assessment of the
law, developing the President’s interpretation of the law without an eye to what
courts would likely do.253 And finally, they could act more like a private lawyer,
giving a legal interpretation that best advances the President’s political interests
without regard to either judicial precedent or jurisprudential norms.254
If Congress passes a law that is unconstitutional on its face, over the
objection of OLC, should the President enforce it and should the DOJ defend
it? President Andrew Johnson famously removed Secretary of War Edwin
McMasters Stanton in defiance of the Tenure in Office Act,255 which deprived
him of the right to remove certain cabinet members.256 This deliberate refusal
to abide by a congressional edict formed the basis for the articles of
impeachment against him.257 Johnson’s lawyer defended him by arguing that the
President was obligated to decline to enforce such a blatantly unconstitutional
law.258 Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase agreed, insisting that a President has no
obligation to enforce a law that “directly attacks and impairs the Executive
power confided to him by the Constitution.”259 Thus, at least according to this
argument, there is some independent obligation on the part of the Executive to
determine constitutional flaws for itself and act appropriately. If the law is
manifestly unconstitutional then the President cannot and should not enforce
it. This is particularly true where a law clearly takes away a core executive
function.
Given the President’s constitutional obligation to take care that the laws
are faithfully executed, OLC’s own recent guidelines for its lawyers should
govern. OLC should strive to provide a neutral interpretation of the law,
regardless of the interest of the policymakers who have sent a request for
interpretation. If OLC’s job is to provide a neutral opinion, it ought to have
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See id. at 507–08.
See McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function, supra note 226, at 382–89.
See id. at 389–402.
See id. at 402–03.
Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867) (repealed 1887).
See ELEANORE BUSHNELL, CRIMES, FOLLIES, AND MISFORTUNES: THE FEDERAL
IMPEACHMENT TRIALS 133–34 (1992).
257. See id. at 134.
258. See id. at 146.
259. J. W. SCHUCKERS, THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF SALMON PORTLAND CHASE 577
(Mnemosyne Publ’g Co. 1969) (1874).
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some minimal obligation to review the facts that the President assumes to
support executive action.260 That said, OLC is within the executive branch so it
makes sense for it to issue opinions that tend to strengthen the power of the
Executive. If courts are asked to review the legal issue at hand, they are free to
defer to the legal analysis or disregard it, understanding that its authors sought,
at least in part, to protect executive prerogative.261
What is problematic, as Roisman argues, is that OLC has been weighing
in with increased frequency in controversial political battles, its reasoning has
been tenuous, and even more importantly, it has put forth positions of personal
political value to the sitting President rather than interpretations of the law that
favor executive power generally.262 The opinion on whether the Internal
Revenue Service ought to turn over President Trump’s taxes, for instance, has
little to do with executive power generally. The power to withhold taxes from
the public is not clearly in the executive interest in the long run, though it may
be in some individual Presidents’ interests.
In order to maintain its integrity as a source of wise and independent legal
advice, OLC ought to issue fewer controversial political opinions. Those ought
to be left to other lawyers like the White House Counsel. In highly charged
political cases, it will be hard for the OLC to maintain its neutrality without
alienating the administration. Even if it follows its direction to promote “the
best understanding of what the law requires,” the public perception will likely
question its integrity. While the White House Counsel is the lawyer to the
presidency, not the lawyer to the administration, the political and partisan
aspect of the job is well known and accepted.263 The taint of partisan
decisionmaking, or the appearance of partisan decisionmaking, is less likely to
undermine the effectiveness of the White House Counsel or other
administration lawyers than it is with OLC.
E.

Prosecutors

The Judiciary Act of 1789 divided the country into districts and provided
for a chief attorney to supervise criminal prosecution and civil actions in which
260. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (barring a lawyer
from making claims that do not have a basis in law or fact). Private lawyers who issue opinions without
reviewing the relevant factual basis for those opinions have been criticized. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon,
A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1187–88 (2003)
(describing the failure of lawyers to investigate the facts underlying the legal opinions they offered to
Enron).
261. See, e.g., Trump v. Vance, 395 F. Supp. 3d 283, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (rejecting much of the
reasoning of OLC memoranda in refusing to grant President Trump’s request for an injunction against
a New York grand jury subpoena directed at his accounting firm for financial records), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 941 F.3d 631 (2d Cir. 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-635 (U.S. May 12, 2020).
262. See Roisman, The Real Decline of OLC, supra note 235.
263. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 229, at 117–18.
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the government had an interest.264 Initially, these jobs were political rewards for
loyal supporters.265 District attorneys were paid in fees and simultaneously
engaged in private practice, a custom that was not forbidden until 1950.266 The
Attorney General had no control over these district attorneys, who were largely
responsible to the district judges in their jurisdictions.267 In 1861, Congress
centralized control by giving the Attorney General power over district
attorneys.268
While scholars disagree on the degree of legal or enforceable independence
prosecutors have from the President,269 most agree that, as a matter of practice,
Presidents should not direct prosecutors’ decisions in individual cases.270
Reflecting that consensus, DOJ created an Assistant Attorney General for the
Criminal Division.271 This structural reform was designed to create a layer
between the Attorney General, who may have policy and personal attachments
to the President, and the day-to-day enforcement of the criminal laws.272
Administrations from Carter to Trump have issued guidance on
communications from the White House to DOJ regarding individual
investigations.273 Responding to the recent Watergate scandal, Attorney
General Griffin Bell implemented a number of practices to preserve DOJ
independence. He instructed that Assistant Attorneys General should report
important decisions to the Deputy Attorney General or the Attorney General,
but if the political appointees disagreed with the Assistant Attorney General’s
opinion, the disagreement had to be written down and publicly disclosed if
possible.274 The memo also asks Assistant Attorneys General to report any
communication from the White House or Congress about specific litigation
decisions.275

264. HUSTON, supra note 23, at 63–64.
265. Id. at 64.
266. See id. at 64–65.
267. Id. at 65.
268. Act of Aug. 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285, 285. But see Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 65, 12 Stat.
327 (explaining that district attorneys would also still report to the Secretary of the Treasury).
269. See, e.g., Green & Roiphe, Can the President Control, supra note 24, at 3–7.
270. For a discussion of how this has become a generally accepted norm, see Renan, Presidential
Norms, supra note 2, at 2207–15.
271. See BAKER, supra note 29, at 169.
272. See id.
273. See, e.g., Bell, Address Before DOJ Lawyers, supra note 84; Memorandum from Donald F.
McGahn II to All White House Staff, supra note 85.
274. See Bell, Address Before DOJ Lawyers, supra note 84, at 8.
275. Id. at 7.
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1. The Role of Federal Prosecutors
The Criminal Division supervises the enforcement of all federal criminal
laws, except those that are assigned to other divisions within DOJ.276 Federal
prosecutors wield a great deal of power. United States Attorneys, originally
called district attorneys, can request the initiation of an investigation into a
violation of criminal law.277 They have broad power to bring charges,278 decline
to prosecute,279 consider alternatives to prosecution,280 and plea bargain.281
While the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were enacted to rein in the
discretion of federal judges, it is largely understood that they increased the
power and discretion of federal prosecutors.282 The increased discretion has led
scholars to remark on the increasingly vast power and responsibility of
prosecutors.283 Prosecutors do not have a client in the ordinary sense. They
represent the public’s abstract interest in justice.284 As such, they owe
obligations to the community, including both the victim and the defendant.
This obligation includes a duty to be fair.285
Federal prosecutors are regulated by state courts through local ethical rules
as well as by federal courts and Congress, but much of what they do remains
beyond the reach of regulation.286 The abstract nature of the prosecutor’s client
as well as the need for independence from political influence leave prosecutors
in charge of much of their own conduct. While prosecutors’ power is restricted
by courts and legislatures, and scholars have suggested various ways to further
regulate them, the system relies, in large part, on professional and institutional
norms to guide prosecutorial decisionmaking.287

276. JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 9-1.000.
277. Id. § 9-2.010.
278. Id. § 9-2.030.
279. Id. § 9-2.020.
280. Id. § 9-2.022.
281. See id. § 9-16.000.
282. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 394 (1992).
283. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 399 (2001).
284. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
285. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 6
(1940) (famously articulating this longstanding obligation in a 1940 speech).
286. For an analysis of the regulation of federal prosecutors, see Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 390–417 (2002).
287. See generally Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too
Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69 (1995) (discussing the role of federal district courts, the
Office of Professional Responsibility, and state disciplinary authorities in regulating federal
prosecutors); Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors?, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 355 (1996) (arguing that state courts should retain primary responsibility for regulating federal
prosecutors). For an argument that professional and institutional norms are necessary to supplement
regulation, see generally Green & Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts, supra note 165.
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While insufficiently concrete, these norms at least dictate which sorts of
reasons ought to guide a prosecutor’s decision and which are inappropriate.
Thus, notions of fairness, efficiency, retribution, legality, and deterrence,
among others, can properly factor into decisions, while personal gain, partisan
advantage, and institutional interest cannot.288 Therefore, one of the central
goals of regulation and structural reform has been to preserve prosecutorial
independence while ensuring sufficient accountability.289
2. The Ethical Responsibility of Federal Prosecutors
Of the different Justice Department roles, the prosecutor’s is probably the
best theorized. Generations of scholars have observed the vast power of
prosecutors, offering insight into how prosecutors ought to act and how they
should be regulated.290 For the purposes of this section, there is no need to
weigh in on the various arguments for regulatory reform. The intention is only
to articulate what the goal of regulatory reform ought to be.
Prosecutors have a duty to do justice.291 Of course, it is far easier to state
this obligation than to define it. A prosecutor’s obligation could involve the
duty to seek procedural justice or it could mean a greater substantive obligation
to ensure the appropriate outcome of the case.292 The vague mandate could
conceivably lead different prosecutors to different conclusions in the same case
because it does not offer clear guidance on how to weigh or prioritize legitimate
considerations, including the defendant’s rights, the victim’s rights, retribution,
and mercy.293

288. See Green & Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts, supra note 165, at 476–84.
289. See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, 69 AM. U. L. REV.
805, 862 (2020) [hereinafter Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution].
290. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50,
60 (1968); Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department of Justice,
99 VA. L. REV. 271, 272–74 (2013); Stephanos Bibas, Observers as Participants: Letting the Public Monitor
the Criminal Justice Bureaucracy, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 342, 342–43 (2014); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt,
Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not To Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1660 (2010);
Davis, supra note 283, at 397; Green & Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, supra note 165, at 840; David
Alan Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship Between Prosecutors and Democracy in the United States, in
PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 276, 276–77 (Máximo Langer &
David Alan Sklansky eds., 2017); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1521, 1522 (1981).
291. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019) (“A prosecutor
has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”). See generally Bruce
A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 608, 611 (1999)
[hereinafter Green, Why Should Prosecutors] (describing the duty to do justice as an assumed fact at the
United States Attorney’s office and as a facet of the prosecutor’s “professional ethos”); Zacharias, supra
note 187, at 46 (citing the Model Rules’ assignment of prosecutors’ duty to do justice).
292. See Green, Why Should Prosecutors, supra note 291, at 622.
293. See id. at 622–23.
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But what the mandate does do is clarify impermissible considerations for
prosecutorial decisionmaking. A prosecutor should not weigh his own personal
advancement or partisan political advantage. He should not think about what
might benefit his office either reputationally or financially. In other words, a
prosecutor has a fiduciary duty of neutrality, fairness, and disinterestedness, a
duty not to consider his own personal advancement or that of his office,
colleagues, or some other third party.294
The Supreme Court in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.295
suggested that this disinterestedness requirement might in limited situations
include an obligation to avoid the appearance of bias.296 The Court reversed a
criminal contempt conviction, which had been prosecuted by a private
prosecutor who was also representing the victim in a related civil proceeding.297
The Court concluded that the prosecution undermined the basic commitment
that the state act in a “rigorously disinterested fashion.”298 In reversing the
conviction, the Court stated that even if the prosecutor did not act in favor of
his private client, the risk in these circumstances was too high.299 While the
Court failed to articulate a constitutional due process right to a disinterested
prosecutor,300 the dicta suggests that prosecutors ought to strive to both be and
appear impartial.301 Although the Court has been reticent to voice a strong or
enforceable obligation, it has at least declared an aspiration that “justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.”302
Federal prosecutors must be able to make decisions without partisan
pressure. They should, of course, allocate resources and focus priorities on areas
of interest to elected officials, but when they make discretionary decisions in
individual cases, such as the decision to investigate, charge, plea bargain, and
recommend sentences, they should be driven by proper concerns such as truth
seeking, legality, deterrence, proportionality, equality, and efficiency.303

294. See Green & Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts, supra note 165, at 471–72; Green &
Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, supra note 165, at 847–52.
295. 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
296. See id. at 811.
297. Id. at 814.
298. Id. at 810.
299. Id. at 807 n.18 (“An arrangement represents an actual conflict of interest if its potential for
misconduct is deemed intolerable.”).
300. See Green & Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts, supra note 165, at 490.
301. See Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 811 (noting that the appointment of an interested prosecutor “creates
an appearance of impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in
general”).
302. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (upholding the disqualification of a judge from
a contempt proceeding of a lawyer because the defense counsel and judge had exchanged heated insults
at the underlying trial).
303. See Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, supra note 289, at 808.
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III. DOJ LAWYERS IN THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
How well have DOJ lawyers lived up to these roles under increased
pressure from the Trump administration? Examples from the current
administration help highlight the vulnerability of DOJ lawyers’ norms and
traditions as well as their remarkable resiliency under pressure.
A.

Attorney General

President Trump has had two Attorneys General, Jeff Sessions and Bill
Barr, and one Acting Attorney General, Matthew Whitaker. Trump publicly
criticized Attorney General Sessions for failing to look into Hillary Clinton’s
lost emails.304 When Sessions recused himself from the investigation into
Russian interference in the 2016 election, Trump excoriated him on Twitter for
doing so.305 He used the same public platform to direct Sessions to investigate
Clinton for potential criminal acts and urged him to reverse his decision on
recusal.306 After his effort to convince Sessions and White House Counsel Don
McGahn to influence Special Counsel Robert Mueller, or even have him fired,
in July 2017, Trump tried to recruit his former campaign adviser Corey
Lewandowski to convince Sessions to reassert control over the Russia
investigation.307 Ultimately, the President forced Sessions out and replaced him
temporarily with Whitaker.308
Amidst accusations that he had appointed Whitaker because of his public
stance against the Mueller investigation, Trump eventually nominated Bill Barr
for Attorney General.309 At his confirmation hearings, Barr promised he would
maintain the independence of the Department of Justice. He swore that he
would protect the legitimacy of the institution. Articulating a clear message that
neutral principles should guide DOJ, Barr stated: “I’m in a position in life where
I can provide the leadership necessary to protect the independence and the
304. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 25, 2017, 3:12 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/889790429398528000 [https://perma.cc/AT7N-U8UB];
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 24, 2017, 5:49 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/889467610332528641 [https://perma.cc/EFY9-B638].
305. See Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 5, 2018, 4:31 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1003962584352030720 [https://perma.cc/5BST-Z3BZ].
306. See 2 ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION
INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 5 (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z9DH-LXZB].
307. See id.
308. See Peter Baker, Katie Benner & Michael D. Shear, Jeff Sessions Is Forced Out as Attorney
General
as
Trump
Installs
Loyalist,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
7,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/sessions-resigns.html
[https://perma.cc/8KZ2Z2YD (dark archive)].
309. David Smith, Trump Nominates William Barr as Next Attorney General, GUARDIAN (Dec. 7,
2018),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/07/donald-trump-nominates-william-barrattorney-general [https://perma.cc/PV92-3LVT].
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reputation of the department . . . . [I won’t] be bullied into doing anything I
think is wrong . . . .”310 That said, in an exchange with Senator Amy Klobuchar,
Barr explained that he would help the administration justify action with a
“reasonable construction of law” even if it was not what he would have chosen
to do.311 Under the standard outlined in Part II, this seems like a fairly good
definition of the Attorney General’s job, especially the vow to protect the
independence of DOJ. Barr’s conception of his role, at least as articulated in the
confirmation hearings, was appropriate. In retrospect, the legislators might have
asked him how he intended to protect DOJ from political influence. A
commitment to the practices and traditions outlined above might have been
more useful than a broad, vague statement about independence.
Barr’s handling of the Mueller Report led many to question this
commitment.312 After reviewing the report, Barr offered his own conclusion that
the President had not obstructed justice despite Mueller’s carefully reasoned
choice not to opine on the question.313 Barr’s letter to leaders of the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees summarizing the report made it seem as if
Mueller had determined that there was not enough evidence to support criminal
charges, which was, at a minimum, misleading.314 Once the report came out, it
became clear that while Mueller did conclude that there was not enough
evidence to prove a criminal conspiracy, he laid out multiple acts that could
constitute obstruction of justice and noted that he would not offer an opinion
since it was the constitutional role of Congress, not DOJ, to do so.315 The New
310. Zapotosky et al., supra note 125.
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., David Rohde, How William Barr Politicized the Release of the Mueller Report, NEW
YORKER (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/current/william-barr-mueller-reportreleased-donald-trump-press-conference [https://perma.cc/56AQ-M9HX] (describing how Attorney
General Barr failed to be apolitical during the Mueller Investigation); William Saletan, Barr Is Lying
About Mueller’s Evidence, SLATE (June 7, 2019), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/06/barrlying-mueller-report.html [https://perma.cc/42YA-BJEL] (detailing Attorney General Barr’s various
statements when attempting to defend President Trump from accusations of abuse of power and
obstruction of justice); Jacqueline Thomsen, Barr Faces Political Storm over Mueller Report, HILL (Mar.
25, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/435727-barr-faces-political-storm-over-muellerreport [https://perma.cc/TR2F-EQGQ] (describing Democrats’ questioning of Attorney General
Barr’s conclusion on the Mueller Report).
313. Letter from Attorney Gen. William Barr to Senator Lindsay Graham, Representative Jerrold
Nadler, Senator Dianne Feinstein, and Representative Doug Collins 3 (Mar. 24, 2019), https://gamescdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/documents/9048a12b-2332-4645-a1bed645db216eb5/note/6f3248a4-4d94-4d5f-ad42-8ff6ccb1a89e.pdf#page=1
[https://perma.cc/R4LBT4YJ]. For a discussion of the difference between Barr’s presentation and Mueller’s, see Mark Mazzetti
& Charlie Savage, Standing Where Barr Cleared Trump on Obstruction, Mueller Makes a Different Case,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/us/politics/mueller-barr.html
[https://perma.cc/4WMS-4GNS (dark archive)].
314. See Mazzetti & Savage, supra note 313.
315. See Charlie Savage, How Barr’s Excerpts Compare to the Mueller Report’s Findings, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/us/politics/mueller-report-william-barrexcerpts.html [https://perma.cc/F53D-PGKF (dark archive)].
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York Times reported in early April that members of Mueller’s team were
disappointed with Barr’s letter, finding it misrepresented the President’s
criminal exposure.316 Weeks later, the DOJ released a letter from Special
Counsel Mueller written shortly after Barr’s summary, objecting to the
Attorney General’s description of the report.317 This internal struggle made
public itself undermined the integrity of the DOJ and invited speculation about
political motivation. Of course, lawyers will disagree, but they ought to follow
internal procedures for resolving difference of opinion rather than airing these
disputes publicly. In this instance, the special counsel was appointed because
political appointees like Barr had perceived conflicts. Therefore, Mueller’s
determination ought to have prevailed.
Given the hybrid nature of the Attorney General’s job, it is critical to
assess ethical responsibility with attention to the function he is serving. When
Bill Barr issued his summary of the Mueller Report and opined on the
obstruction charge, he was supervising a criminal investigation. His job was to
protect the nonpartisan nature of criminal prosecution as well as the appearance
of impartiality. This obligation was, if anything, heightened given the
President’s repeated accusations that the Mueller investigation was a politically
motivated “witch hunt.”318 He should have worked to guard the independence
of the DOJ and preserve its legitimacy by maintaining the lawyers’ reputation
as impartial administrators of justice, at least before obtaining clear evidence to
the contrary.319
Bill Barr failed in this regard. Robert Mueller had carefully declined to
decide the question of criminal responsibility. He did so because DOJ policy
dictates that a sitting President cannot be indicted.320 The Constitution
designates Congress and the voting public as the proper entities to hold a
President accountable.321 The ability of Congress and the public to hold the

316. Nicholas S. Fandos, Michael S. Schmidt & Mark Mazzetti, Some on Mueller’s Team Say Report
Was More Damaging Than Barr Revealed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/03/us/politics/william-barr-mueller-report.html
[https://perma.cc/R9F8-GF7N
(dark
archive)].
317. See Mark Mazzetti & Michael S. Schmidt, Mueller Objected to Barr’s Description of Russia
Investigation’s Findings on Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/30/us/politics/mueller-barr.html [https://perma.cc/NX4E-49SY (dark archive)].
318. See Olivia Paschal, Trump’s Tweets and the Creation of ‘Illusory Truth,’ ATLANTIC (Aug. 3,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/08/how-trumps-witch-hunt-tweets-createan-illusory-truth/566693/ [https://perma.cc/WA92-FMBQ (dark archive)] (cataloguing the repeated
assaults on Mueller’s investigation and explaining how this tactic could work to undermine the public’s
faith in the probe and in the DOJ in general).
319. Cf. Bell, Address Before the L.A. County Bar, supra note 106, at 9–10.
320. See A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op.
O.L.C. 222, 222 (2000); Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., supra note 230, at 16.
321. Impeachment is mentioned in several places in the Constitution. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 2, cl. 5 (giving the House of Representatives the “sole Power of Impeachment”); id. art. I, § 3, cl.
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President accountable through impeachment and election does not depend on a
professional interpretation of criminal statutes but rather on full access to the
facts. By refusing to offer a legal conclusion, Mueller left it to Congress and the
public to use their own standards and judgment to assess the President’s
conduct. Weeks before the redacted version of the Mueller Report became
public, Barr insisted that it was his job to decide the question.322 By doing so,
he plunged the DOJ into political debate and opened it to allegations of partisan
bias.323 Since criminal investigations are supposed to be nonpartisan, Barr
should have followed Mueller’s lead by declining to involve the DOJ in a
necessarily partisan decision about presidential accountability, especially when
DOJ’s own legal opinion prevented it from considering an indictment. This is
especially true because the special counsel was appointed in part due to concerns
that the Attorney General and prosecutors who reported directly to him would
be biased due to his close relationship with the individuals who were being
investigated.324
In summarizing the Mueller Report and opining on the question of
whether the President obstructed justice, Barr betrayed his role—but not
because he was too political or partisan. Attorneys General are often political
actors, cabinet members chosen by the President to advise closely on important
policy matters. He failed because he did not filter political motivations from
prosecutorial decisions, and this dereliction undermined the independence of
federal criminal law enforcement. Once the executive summaries of the report
came out and it became clear that some on Mueller’s team objected to Barr’s
characterization of the report,325 Barr not only appeared himself a political actor
but cast doubt on the Mueller team, undermining the legitimacy of the law
6 (giving the Senate “the sole Power to try all Impeachments”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (limiting the
consequence of impeachment to removal from office).
322. See Melanie Schmitz, Barr Decided To Clear Trump of Obstruction Before Reading Mueller’s
Report, THINKPROGRESS (May 1, 2019), https://thinkprogress.org/william-barr-attorney-generalcleared-trump-obstruction-before-reading-mueller-report-84f8cde8bfa4/
[https://perma.cc/EZ9XJPGC] (discussing testimony Barr gave in response to questioning by Senator Sheldon Whitehouse
(D-RI) on May 1, 2019).
323. See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, Nadler: Barr Is ‘Biased’ and Mueller’s Trump-Russia Report Must Be
Released, GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/apr/07/nadler-barrbiased-mueller-trump-russia-report [https://perma.cc/U2KN-YELM]; Abigail Tracy, “It’s Not What the
Department of Justice Does”: Barr and Durham Go Rogue on the Inspector General’s Report, VANITY FAIR
(Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2019/12/bill-barr-john-durham-michael-horowitzinspector-general-report [https://perma.cc/E9DQ-3F9W (dark archive)].
324. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.1(a) (2019) (providing that a special counsel should be appointed when
the United States Attorneys’ Offices would have a conflict of interest).
325. See Devlin Barrett & Matt Zapotosky, Mueller Complained That Barr’s Letter Did Not Capture
‘Context’ of Trump Probe, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/mueller-complained-that-barrs-letter-did-not-capture-context-of-trump-probe/
2019/04/30/d3c8fdb6-6b7b-11e9-a66d-a82d3f3d96d5_story.html
[https://perma.cc/WW6R-SL9B
(dark archive)].
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enforcement decisions they made. Barr also made it such that future related
decisions, like those made by United States Attorney John Durham in the
Russia probe, will inevitably be questioned based on allegations of political bias.
Internal disagreements should never have been aired publicly and ought to have
been resolved pursuant to internal policies. The dispute between the Attorney
General and the special counsel’s team cast doubt on the legitimacy of the
special counsel’s work and made it seem, at least, as if the President’s partisan
and personal agenda had shaped the law enforcement conclusion that Barr
made. If Barr had followed proper procedure for internally investigating DOJ
officials and decisions, he would have achieved his goal of examining the origins
of the Russia probe without sacrificing the legitimacy of the DOJ as a
nonpartisan, independent organization.
Just two weeks after receiving the report, on April 10, 2019, Attorney
General Barr testified before a Senate Appropriations Committee and
suggested that he was going to look into the origins of the Russia probe and that
he believed “spying” had occurred.326 Despite the fact that the Inspector
General was already scrutinizing the origins of the investigation, Barr referred
the case to Assistant United States Attorney John Durham for a criminal
investigation.327 Using the term “spying” to describe a court-ordered wiretap
played into the President’s rhetoric delegitimizing law enforcement and the
FBI. Barr’s choice of words echoed the President, who called Michael Cohen a
“rat” for cooperating with federal authorities328 and insisted that the FBI had
“broke in to” Cohen’s office when it executed a court-ordered warrant.329 Barr’s
political allegiance to Trump alone ought not to be the basis for criticism, but
casting criminal justice decisions as illegitimate using language of the criminal
underworld without proof is.
Once the Inspector General’s report was released, Barr once again failed
to preserve the legitimacy and independence of federal law enforcement
decisions by publicly disagreeing with the Inspector General’s conclusions. The
326. See Devlin Barrett & Karoun Demirjian, Attorney General Says He Believes ‘Spying Did Occur’
in Probe of Trump Campaign Associates, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/attorney-general-faces-second-day-of-questioning-about-muellersreport/2019/04/09/362cc648-5b02-11e9-a00e-050dc7b82693_story.html
[https://perma.cc/PTH8SLMH (dark archive)].
327. See Katie Benner & Adam Goldman, Justice Dept. Is Said To Open Criminal Inquiry into Its Own
Russia Investigation, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/24/
us/politics/john-durham-criminal-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/6KKB-DH3P (dark archive)].
328. See Isaac Stanley-Becker, Calling Michael Cohen a ‘Rat,’ Trump Brings ‘American Underworld’
Lingo to the White House, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2018/12/17/calling-michael-cohen-rat-trump-brings-american-underworld-lingo-white-house/
[https://perma.cc/Z42X-BRL6 (dark archive)].
329. See Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Raids Office of Trump’s Longtime Lawyer Michael Cohen; Trump Calls It
‘Disgraceful,’ N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/us/politics/fbi-raidsoffice-of-trumps-longtime-lawyer-michael-cohen.html [https://perma.cc/V2B4-Z8CU (dark archive)].
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Inspector General’s report found plenty to criticize about the FBI and the FISA
warrant process, but it also clearly concluded that the origins of the
investigation were unbiased and valid, as were the major law enforcement
decisions.330 This conclusion clearly undermined one of the President’s talking
points: that the Russia probe itself was a politically motivated “witch hunt.”331
Without citing support for his disagreement, Barr made a public statement that
the FBI had launched the investigation on “the thinnest of suspicions” that he
concluded were insufficient to justify the probe.332 Departing from DOJ policy
not to comment on an ongoing investigation, Assistant United States Attorney
John Durham similarly publicly stated that he disagreed with some of the
report’s conclusions.333 Both of these public statements, which depart from
internal guidelines and practices, undermine faith in the DOJ and demonstrate
Barr’s failure to adhere to the proper role for the Attorney General.
If Durham’s conclusions diverge from the Inspector General’s, he should
have waited until the conclusion of his investigation to say so. With few
exceptions, the only way in which prosecutors are permitted to speak is through
indictments.334 It is extremely rare to issue a public update on an ongoing
investigation.335 By failing to adhere to procedures and publicly airing, once
again, an internal disagreement with his own department, Barr undermined the
legitimacy of the DOJ and failed to prevent improper partisan concerns from
infiltrating law enforcement decisions. Even if DOJ remains untainted by these
pronouncements, Barr has done damage to the public faith in the law
department as a neutral body. Of course it is important and even critical to have
robust checks on law enforcement abuses, but it is equally important for an
Attorney General to abide by proper procedures when alleging or investigating
such abuses to ensure that any internal monitoring of DOJ lawyers’ and agents’
conduct is not motivated by partisan, political concerns or a personal loyalty to
the President, or perceived as such.
330. See Charlie Savage, Adam Goldman & Katie Benner, Report on F.B.I. Russia Inquiry Finds
Serious Errors but Debunks Anti-Trump Plot, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/12/09/us/politics/fbi-ig-report-russia-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/59PX-4FLM (dark
archive)].
331. See id.
332. See Katie Benner, Barr and Durham Publicly Disagree with Horowitz Report on Russia Inquiry,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/09/us/politics/barr-durham-igreport-russia-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/2878-DRSC (dark archive)].
333. Id.
334. The Justice Manual states, “DOJ generally will not confirm the existence of or otherwise
comment about ongoing investigations. . . . DOJ personnel shall not respond to questions about the
existence of an ongoing investigation or comment on its nature or progress before charges are publicly
filed.” JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 6, § 1-7.400(B). The only exception is when the public needs to
be reassured that the appropriate law enforcement agency is investigating a matter or if the information
is necessary to protect the public safety, neither of which apply here as the public already knew that
Durham was investigating the matter further. See id. § 1-7.400(C).
335. See id. § 1-7.400.
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Two thousand former members of the Justice Department accused
Attorney General Barr of politicizing the Department after he overruled the
sentencing recommendation in the Roger Stone case, a prosecution that arose
out of Robert Mueller’s investigation.336 The U.S. Attorney’s Office in
Washington, D.C., had recommended a sentence of seven to nine years, which
was within the sentencing guidelines range. Barr ordered the submission of a
new memo, recommending a sentence “far less” than the previous
recommendation. After the second memo was submitted, four U.S. Attorneys
withdrew from the case and one of those four resigned from DOJ.337 When
President Trump tweeted his approval of Barr’s new memo and questioned the
judge’s ability to be neutral, Barr complained that the President’s tweets were
making it “impossible for me to do my job.”338
In other politically sensitive cases, Barr has taken the unusual step of
assigning lawyers, both within and outside of DOJ, to review the work of the
original prosecutors.339 The Attorney General has also assigned a prosecutor in
Pittsburgh to consider evidence that the President’s personal attorney Rudy
Giuliani gathers in Ukraine on political rival Joe Biden and his son, Hunter.340
All of this gives the appearance, at least, that the President is hand picking his
prosecutors, shopping around to find those who will do his bidding. Even
assuming that Barr has not coordinated this work with Trump, Barr is the most
336. Melissa Quinn, 2,000 Ex-Justice Department Employees Call on Barr To Resign over Roger Stone
Case, CBS NEWS (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/1100-ex-justice-departmentemployees-call-on-william-barr-to-resign-over-roger-stone-case/ [https://perma.cc/5AT3-9F59]. In a
strongly worded op-ed, Donald Ayer, former U.S. Deputy Attorney General under George H.W.
Bush, also called for Barr’s resignation. Donald Ayer, Bill Barr Must Resign, ATLANTIC (Feb. 17, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/donald-ayer-bill-barr-must-resign/606670/
[https://perma.cc/SXA9-XFWZ (dark archive)].
337. See Brian Naylor, Attorney General Barr To Testify in House Amid Criticism over Roger Stone Case,
NPR (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/02/12/805159485/trump-praises-attorney-generalbarr-for-taking-charge-of-roger-stone-case [https://perma.cc/8LHQ-W7BS].
338. Dareh Gregorian, AG Barr Says Trump Tweets ‘Make It Impossible for Me To Do My Job,’ NBC
NEWS (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/ag-barr-says-trump-tweetsmake-it-impossible-me-do-n1136726 [https://perma.cc/4CJQ-R37H]. This statement echoes Barr’s
assertion at his confirmation hearing that he considers it his job to protect the independence of DOJ.
See supra note 310 and accompanying text. It is, however, also in tension with Barr’s confident assertion
during the same hearing that he has the capacity to do so. Barr’s frustration with the President seems
disingenuous given that he must have known before he took the job that Trump frequently opines on
DOJ decisions, particularly those related to the Mueller investigation, thereby making it hard for
prosecutors to appear impartial and apolitical.
339. See Devlin Barrett, Matt Zapotosky & Josh Dawson, Barr’s Internal Reviews and ReInvestigations Feed Resentment, Suspicion Inside Justice Dept., WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/barrs-internal-reviews-and-re-investigationsfeed-resentment-suspicion-inside-justice-dept/2020/02/15/7007695a-5029-11ea-9b5ceac5b16dafaa_story.html [https://perma.cc/D9VR-P6WD (dark archive)].
340. See Evan Perez, Manu Raju & Jeremy Herb, Federal Prosecutors in Pittsburgh Vetting Guiliani’s
Ukraine Allegations, CNN: POLITICS (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/11/
politics/pittsburgh-giuliani-ukraine-allegations/index.html [https://perma.cc/NC4P-2S26].
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politically connected official within DOJ, as explained above, so it is
inappropriate for him to take control over and second guess the discretionary
decisions that prosecutors make in individual cases, particularly in politically
sensitive ones.
In serving as a filter to keep political influence out of federal prosecution,
Barr ought to preserve the practices that are designed to promote that end. One
of these practices is that, as a general matter, line assistants and local United
States Attorneys are responsible for making decisions in individual cases, and
political actors and their appointees, like Barr himself, maintain a distance. Of
course, he can and should communicate the administration’s policy priorities
with prosecutors but that hardly seems to be what happened here. While Barr
claims that by taking control of the case he will ensure political accountability,
much of what prosecutors do never becomes public.341 It will be impossible for
voters to know whether decisions to prosecute were made for political reasons
or not. Nor can the public have faith that decisions not to prosecute, similarly
opaque deliberations, were made in a fair and evenhanded way.
Rather than ensuring order, fairness, or accountability, Barr has sown
distrust because he has failed to filter political considerations from prosecutorial
decisionmaking. He has failed to promote faith in the neutral enforcement of
the laws. By complaining that it was the President’s tweets and not his own
conduct that undermined faith in prosecutorial neutrality, he misunderstands
his job. The President should respect prosecutorial independence, but the
Attorney General provides an extra layer of protection. Of course, serving that
role is difficult when the President seeks to influence prosecutorial decisions,
but Barr was aware of this added challenge when we took the job. Even if he
truly believes he is acting in a neutral way, a premise that is belied by at least
some of his acts, Barr’s job is not only to act without political bias, it is also to
preserve the legitimacy of DOJ. He knew that this was going to be difficult
when he took the job, but he has compounded the problem rather than doing
what he could to preserve the reputation of the institution as it is under assault.
It is hard to assess exactly the harm done by Barr’s failure to fulfill the
proper role of an Attorney General. Some have suggested that his conduct has
already had consequences within the DOJ.342 But the real test is whether the
institution can regain the respect of a broad majority of Americans such that its
fact investigations and enforcement actions have the legitimacy necessary to
support the rule of law. If federal criminal investigations and proceedings can
341. For a discussion of how Barr justifies his decisions, see David Rohde, Why Is William Barr
Really Criticizing Donald Trump, NEW YORKER (Feb. 14, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/
daily-comment/who-is-william-barr [https://perma.cc/2387-7JFE (dark archive)].
342. See David Shortell, Evan Perez & Josh Campbell, FBI Agents Warn of ‘Chilling Effect’ from
Trump and Barr Attacks, CNN: POLITICS (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/12/
12/politics/fbi-chilling-effect-trump-barr-attacks/index.html [https://perma.cc/NYK5-DTHF].
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be convincingly cast as biased and partisan without proof, then the American
public would be right to be skeptical of the entire institution. At such a point,
it is not clear that the American public would abide by or trust the results of
such enforcement actions.
While it may be true that Barr intended only to preserve the power of a
strong presidency against what he deemed an excessively aggressive
investigation, his conduct was unethical because he owed a duty to the public
to keep partisan politics out of criminal investigations. He could have followed
orthodox prescribed methods to try to prove his point, but by straying so far
from these procedures, he did serious damage to the legitimacy of the institution
he promised to protect. Even if he was not motivated by a desire to protect
President Trump, his unnecessary conclusion on criminal obstruction in the
Mueller findings undermined the legitimacy of the DOJ by subjecting it to
credible allegations of partisanship.
One thing is important to note, though, in leveling criticism at Barr. The
job of the Attorney General is not apolitical. The Attorney General is a cabinet
member involved in policy decisions and political calculations. He is not a
career prosecutor like many of the United States Attorneys and line prosecutors
who enjoy substantial independence both from the administration and from the
Attorney General himself.343 The layers of subordinate attorneys to whom much
of the work of DOJ is delegated are part of an infrastructure that together
protects law enforcement from the improper infiltration of politics. Thus, while
Barr erred in his role because he failed to screen out partisan political concerns
where appropriate, this error has not fully undermined the legitimacy and
efficacy of DOJ. The layers of lawyers beneath him, in this case Robert Mueller
and the special counsel team, were there to absorb the shock.
B.

Civil Division Lawyers

Recently, Senior Litigation Counsel for the Department of Justice, Sarah
Fabian, argued that the government does not have to supply soap and
toothbrushes to immigrants in border facilities in order to comply with a
settlement agreement that requires “safe and sanitary” conditions.344 The
Trump administration’s political position with regard to immigration is itself
controversial, but this argument spurred a particularly intense reaction. Twitter
users directed their anger, for the most part, at Fabian herself. “[W]hat kind of

343. See Libby Cathey & Ryan Shepard, William Barr: Everything You Need To Know About Trump’s
Controversial Attorney General, ABC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/williambarr-trumps-attorney-general/story?id=59661840 [https://perma.cc/6TET-K4ZL].
344. See Manny Fernandez, Lawyer Draws Outrage for Defending Lack of Toothbrushes in Border
Detention, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/us/sarah-fabianmigrant-lawyer-doj.html [https://perma.cc/N4CE-2T54 (dark archive)].
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vile person would argue this?” one user excoriated.345 Another referred to her as
“[a] heartless DOJ attorney.”346 Another made a personal stab, writing “Never.
Forget. Her name.”347 A New York Times editorial piled on, insisting that any
member of the bar who defends the administration’s treatment of children at
the border ought to be sanctioned.348 If Fabian is supposed to promote justice
in an abstract sense, this criticism would arguably be warranted. If, on the other
hand, she is serving her client—in this case the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”)—the way a private attorney serves his, then under the
standard conception of lawyering described above, she should not be implicated
in the underlying policy, just as private attorneys are not implicated in the
underlying morality of their clients’ actions or agenda.
Based on the ethical duties outlined above,349 Fabian’s argument was
problematic—but not because she did not pursue an abstract notion of justice.
Nor was her argument improper because she ought to be implicated in the
morality of the administration’s border policy. Quite the contrary, as a
government litigator she is obligated to defend this policy on behalf of DHS.
DOJ is, after all, in part a legal arm of the administration, tasked with
representing its interests in court. But government lawyers, like all lawyers, are
not permitted to pursue any line of argument. All attorneys ought to treat the
law with respect and Fabian, like private civil attorneys, has an obligation not
to make unreasonable arguments, even if her client so wished. Arguing that the
government’s failure to provide soap to migrants met the requirement of
providing “sanitary” conditions is like arguing that up is down. Soap is essential
to the prevention of disease. It is necessary to comply with the terms of the
settlement agreement and arguing otherwise is both unreasonable and
unethical.350
The fact that Vice President Mike Pence denied knowledge of Fabian’s
argument and insisted that he believed immigrants at detention facilities should
have soap indicates a potential failure of communication and counseling.351
345. Soledad O’Brien (@soledadobrien), TWITTER (June 22, 2019, 5:19 AM),
https://twitter.com/soledadobrien/status/1142406849918115840 [https://perma.cc/LW75-DRW7].
346. Jon Cooper (@joncoopertweets), TWITTER (June 21, 2019), https://twitter.com/
joncoopertweets/status/1142122467189809152 [https://perma.cc/45VS-L3VQ].
347. Scott Dworkin (@funder), TWITTER (June 23, 2019), https://twitter.com/
funder/status/1142812927914852352 [https://perma.cc/82BZ-7SW8].
348. See Kate Cronin-Furman, The Treatment of Migrants Likely ‘Meets the Definition of a Mass
Atrocity,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/29/opinion/immigrationchildren-detention.html [https://perma.cc/4RNP-6YRH (dark archive)] (“[T]he American Bar
Association should signal that anyone who defends the border patrol’s mistreatment of children will
not be considered a member in good standing of the legal profession.”).
349. See supra Section II.B.2.
350. See WENDEL, supra note 157, at 29–31 (describing the standard conception of legal ethics).
351. See Caroline Kelly & Paul LeBlanc, Pence: ‘Of Course’ Migrant Children Should Have
Toothbrushes, Blankets and Medicine, CNN: POLITICS (June 23, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/

98 N.C. L. REV. 1077 (2020)

1132

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

Perhaps Fabian and the DOJ should have advised DHS that this argument was
unsound and that it should revisit its policy. If she had done so, DHS could
have spoken with the administration and tried to work out a solution other than
defending seemingly indefensible actions in court.352 This lack of
communication between federal civil litigators and their clients is an ongoing
problem in the Trump administration. For instance, in the census case, the DOJ
lawyers argued that there was a deadline for printing the census forms, only to
later explain that perhaps the deadline was not so firm.353 But this observation
does not change the ultimate calculation that Fabian failed not because she did
not pursue justice in an abstract sense but rather because she put forward an
absurd argument on behalf of her client that would be equally unethical in
private civil litigation.
C.

Solicitor General

Solicitor General Noel Francisco argued before the Supreme Court in
April 2019 that the decision to add a citizenship question to the U.S. Census
was not subject to judicial review because Congress had left the issue to the
Commerce Department.354 He further explained that Commerce Secretary
Wilbur Ross acted reasonably in adding the citizenship question when faced
with inadequate alternatives recommended by the census staff.355 The
challengers, including the American Civil Liberties Union and the New York
Attorney General, countered that the citizenship question would result in a
massive undercount, especially among minority communities.356 This, in turn,
would affect federal funding and the calculation of congressional districts.357
Secretary Ross insisted that he added the question because it would be useful
2019/06/23/politics/mike-pence-border-conditions-congress/index.html
[https://perma.cc/M286N2YL].
352. Attorney General Griffin Bell notably pointed out in 1978 that DOJ lawyers fail in counseling
client agencies. Bell, The Attorney General, supra note 247, at 1062–63. Their role, like that of private
lawyers, is not just to pursue the stated interest of the agency but also to advise the client about the
legal problems with the proposed policy. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.4, 2.1 (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2019).
353. See Michael Wines, Katie Benner & Adam Liptak, Justice Dept. To Replace Lawyers in Census
Citizenship Question Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/07/07/us/politics/census-citizenship-question-justice-department.html [https://perma.cc/8DU5HP9E (dark archive)]. This is not an isolated occurrence but rather part of a trend of DOJ attorneys
contradicting the administration. For a list of other similar discrepancies, see Brad Heath
(@bradheath), TWITTER (Dec. 30, 2019, 10:29 AM), https://twitter.com/bradheath/
status/1211715995280248832 [https://perma.cc/QUA2-BL79].
354. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 1543
(2019) (No. 18-966), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2018/18966_i4dj.pdf [https://perma.cc/TAG2-ET4Y].
355. See id. at 6.
356. See id. at 43–44, 65–68.
357. See id. at 70–71.
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in enforcing the Voting Rights Act, but plaintiffs claimed, and several lower
courts agreed, that this reason was pretextual.358 Long after deciding to put the
citizenship question on the Census, Ross pressured the DOJ to come up with a
plausible rationale.359 In a fractured decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the
purported rationale was pretextual.360 While executive branch officials have
broad discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act, they are obligated to
“pursue their goals reasonably. Reasoned decisionmaking under the
Administrative Procedure Act calls for an explanation for agency action. What
was provided here was more of a distraction.”361 The Court remanded the case
with instructions for the agency to provide a better explanation for the
citizenship question.362
Another wrinkle in the case: Solicitor General Noel Francisco represented
to the Court that it ought to decide the appeal on an expedited basis and not
wait for a related case with new evidence about Ross’s intent to conclude.363
Francisco argued, in part, that the delay would burden the government because
the census forms had to be printed by June 30, 2019.364 We now know, after
remand, that the Department of Commerce subsequently acknowledged that it
could print the forms later.365
As explained above, the Solicitor General has a role in assisting the
Supreme Court, helping to ensure a uniformity and rational development of
federal law.366 As such, the Solicitor General, unlike civil government lawyers
litigating on behalf of an agency, owes a special obligation to the law and justice
itself.
While admittedly vague, this standard must mean something more than
that any member of the public can justifiably criticize the Solicitor General for
abandoning his role if he strays from that individual’s own view of the justness
358. See David Lawder, Commerce’s Ross Insists Census Citizenship Question Supports Voting Rights Act,
REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-census-ross/commerces-rossinsists-census-citizenship-question-supports-voting-rights-act-idUSKCN1QV27O
[https://perma.cc/AX74-M8KW].
359. See Barry K. Robinson & Edgar Chen, Principle over Pretext: The Supreme Court Isn’t Buying
What Wilbur Ross Is Selling, JUST SECURITY (July 1, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/
64762/principle-over-pretext-the-supreme-court-isnt-buying-what-wilbur-ross-is-selling/
[https://perma.cc/Q9XU-V3ZM] (discussing how lower courts found evidence that the rationale for
the census question “was essentially a pretext, fabricated at Ross’ direction”).
360. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2757 (2019) (noting that the agency
rationale “seems to have been contrived”).
361. Id. at 2576.
362. See id.
363. See Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Orders Do-Over on Citizenship Question in Census Case
(Updated), SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2019), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/opinion-analysiscourt-orders-do-over-on-citizenship-question-in-census-case/ [https://perma.cc/7RHT-TEDH].
364. See id.
365. Wines et al., supra note 353.
366. See supra Section II.C.2.
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of the government’s position. There must be some mechanism for assessing
whether Francisco served his role other than whether or not he promoted one
particular vision of substantive justice. If the Solicitor General has an obligation
to the rule of law, then it seems more accurate to say that he has an obligation
to put forward reasonable arguments that are well supported in the case law.
He has an obligation to be principled and thoughtful in his arguments and to
stop short of advancing a position of the administration that might cause lasting
damage to orderly development of the law or to the government as a whole. He
does not have to accurately predict how the Supreme Court will rule, but his
argument should offer a plausible and even convincing view. The majority
agreed with Francisco on his constitutional argument,367 and four justices agreed
that the government’s reason for posing the citizenship question was not
pretextual.368 On this record, it is hard to conclude that Francisco betrayed his
obligation.
Critics accused Francisco and other DOJ staff attorneys of misleading the
Court when they argued for an expedited timeframe by asserting that the
Commerce Department had a deadline: the forms had to be printed by the end
of June.369 While it is clearly unethical for any lawyer to lie to the court, it is
worse given the Solicitor General’s special role as advisor to the Supreme
Court. That said, if Francisco had a good faith belief that the deadline was
absolute, then he did not violate that obligation. While it is easy to see now that
the government was not being entirely honest about the deadline or that there
was substantial confusion within DOJ, there is no evidence that Francisco either
knew or should have known that the agency was lying.
D.

Office of Legal Counsel Lawyers

OLC has sanctioned many controversial and legally questionable policies
of the Trump administration. This is not the first administration to use OLC
to support politically charged policies. During the Obama administration, OLC
issued an opinion supporting the President’s controversial Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program, an immigration policy that allowed
certain undocumented immigrants to avoid deportation.370
367. Dep’t of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2567.
368. See id. at 2577–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2597 (Alito,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
369. See, e.g., Tierney Sneed, Eating Its Words: DOJ Now Willing To Blow Right Past Bogus Census
Deadline, TALKING POINTS MEMO (July 9, 2019), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/
news/muckraker/justice-department-trump-census-citizenship-deadline
[https://perma.cc/UGM5DUU6].
370. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Auth. To Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully
Present in the U.S. & To Defer Removal of Others, 38 Op. O.L.C. 1, 17–20 (2014); see also Ming H.
Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87,
97–98 (2016) (discussing President Obama’s DACA program and OLC’s response).
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Others have criticized the substance of recent Trump OLC opinions.371
This section will focus on the opinion OLC issued on the whistleblower
complaint that led to the impeachment proceedings against President Trump
to illustrate two points.372 First, OLC ought to refrain from issuing
controversial political opinions unless absolutely necessary, and second, failing
to do so often leads OLC to compromise its own guidelines to deliver the “best
view of the law” rather than an opinion that advances the President’s or the
administration’s objectives.
In August 2019, an anonymous whistleblower within the intelligence
community detailed a July 25, 2019, phone call between President Trump and
the President of Ukraine, noting in addition the decision by White House
officials to “lock down” the call record.373 The intelligence community Inspector
General Michael Atkinson found the complaint credible and “urgent” and
forwarded it to Director of National Intelligence Joseph Maguire, who initially
declined to pass it on to Congress.374 Instead, Maguire consulted the White
House Counsel’s office and OLC. OLC concluded that the complaint did not
present an “urgent concern,” the statutory predicate for reporting the conduct
to Congress.375 Disagreeing with Maguire, Atkinson informed the House
Intelligence Committee of the whistleblower’s filing.376
OLC reasoned that there was no “urgent concern” necessary to trigger the
statutory obligation to report to Congress. Because the subject of the
complaint—the President—is not a part of the intelligence community and the
complaint didn’t arise out of any intelligence activity, OLC concluded that it
did not meet the standard.377 As such, the Director of National Intelligence was

371. See, e.g., Roisman, The Real Decline of OLC, supra note 235.
372. See “Urgent Concern” Determination by the Inspector Gen. of the Intelligence Cmty., 43
Op. O.L.C., slip op. at 1–3 (Sept. 3, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/olc/opinion/file/1205711/download
[https://perma.cc/P3V5-S2GY]. In analyzing this opinion, this section draws on two Twitter threads
on the subject, by professors Steve Vladek and Shalev Roisman. See Shalev Roisman
(@Shalev_Roisman),
TWITTER
(Sept.
25,
2019,
3:19
PM), https://twitter.com/
Shalev_Roisman/status/1176939393161912320 [https://perma.cc/9BLQ-382Z]; Steve Vladeck
(@steve_vladeck),
TWITTER
(Sept.
25,
2019,
12:20
PM),
https://twitter.com/
steve_vladeck/status/1176894169459187712 [https://perma.cc/VZ7D-UPXB].
373. See Document: Read the Whistle-Blower Complaint, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/09/26/us/politics/whistle-blower-complaint.html
[https://perma.cc/UX2M-F6DS (dark archive)].
374. See Quint Forgey, Government Watchdogs Slam DOJ’s Opinion on Whistleblower Report,
POLITICO (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/25/doj-opinion-whistleblowerreport-057612 [https://perma.cc/QKY7-YMH2].
375. See id.
376. See id.
377. See “Urgent Concern” Determination by the Inspector Gen. of the Intelligence Cmty., slip
op. at 1–3 (interpreting 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(5)(G)(i) (2018)).
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properly governed by a different statute that required reporting potential
criminal conduct to the Attorney General rather than Congress.378
While there is nothing egregious in the legal reasoning of the OLC
opinion, it still represents a violation of the obligations laid out above. The first
problem is the decision to opine at all. The statutory scheme seems to give the
Inspectors General the right to decide what constitutes an “urgent concern”
without consulting OLC.379 Given the highly charged political nature of the
complaint, it would have been wiser to decline to enter the fray. Leaving other
lawyers and officials to interpret the law when it is at least arguably their job
would serve to preserve the role of OLC as nonpartisan legal advisor. Of course,
if OLC had decided on constitutional grounds that the statute violated
separation of powers concerns,380 that might have been more central to its
mission; but wading into a matter of statutory construction when it seems
unambiguous that Congress intended the Inspectors General to interpret the
statute themselves is problematic.381 OLC should not have taken on the task of
interpreting the meaning of “urgent concern” in light of the whistleblower’s
allegation when Congress explicitly assigned that task to the Inspector General.
The OLC opinion includes two facts that have subsequently become
Republican talking points but that are not relevant to the legal determination
in the opinion. OLC notes first that the report was hearsay382 and second that
the Inspector General found some indicia of political bias on the part of the
whistleblower.383 Neither of these two facts, which go to the credibility of the
whistleblower report, are necessary or even relevant to the legal determination
at hand. But the opinion includes them anyway. Whether true or not, these
unnecessary facts tend to make it seem as if the opinion has a broader political
purpose to discredit the whistleblower’s report. It reads more like a brief or
argument with a favorable narrative than an objective view of the law. Even if
OLC’s choice to write this opinion was appropriate, it should have done so
without including unnecessary facts that tend to make its position look partisan.
Finally, this opinion violated the principle, stated above, that OLC should
not wade unnecessarily into highly partisan waters. The complaint went to
Congress despite OLC’s legal opinion, so it had no practical effect. The opinion
adds to the many recent highly partisan legal opinions but ultimately had no
impact on the resulting government actions. It tends to undermine the
378. See id., slip op. at 2 (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 535 (2018)).
379. 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(5)(A)–(B) (2018).
380. The opinion explicitly notes that, by deciding on narrow statutory grounds, it was avoiding
the larger constitutional issue. See “Urgent Concern” Determination by the Inspector Gen. of the
Intelligence Cmty., slip op. at 5 n.5.
381. 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(5)(C).
382. See “Urgent Concern” Determination by the Inspector Gen. of the Intelligence Cmty., slip
op. at 7.
383. Id., slip op. at 4.
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legitimacy of the OLC as a neutral body without any practical trade-off. If the
legal opinion were crucial or necessary to a pressing concern, then OLC might
have no choice; but where, as here, the opinion made no practical difference, it
would be wiser to resist issuing an opinion at all.
It is important for OLC to retain its reputation as a source of excellent
and neutral legal advice, while also remaining helpful to policy makers. This is
not an easy balance because, if OLC offers excellent legal advice that goes
against the administration’s wishes, it may well be marginalized. The best way
to address this concern may be to try to do less. If OLC is more modest and
declines to opine on extremely partisan issues unless asked, it will be less
tempted to compromise its ethical obligation to interpret the law in a
disinterested way.
E.

Federal Prosecutors

The most well-known federal prosecutor during Trump’s administration
has, of course, been Robert Mueller. Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein
appointed Mueller Special Prosecutor shortly after Trump fired former FBI
Director James Comey.384 Mueller was widely respected by both Democrats and
Republicans and hailed as a fair, professional, nonpartisan choice.385 But this
reputation was soon buried under President Trump’s vitriol as he repeatedly
accused Mueller of leading angry Democrats in a “witch hunt.”386
Mueller’s 448-page report was released on April 18, 2019.387 The report
consisted of two parts. The first part found that Trump and his campaign had
not engaged in a criminal conspiracy but detailed numerous instances in which
members of the campaign, including Trump, encouraged and welcomed foreign
interference in the 2016 presidential election.388 The second part catalogued
384. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Appointment of Special Counsel (May 17, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/appointment-special-counsel
[https://perma.cc/BA95-PVWZ];
Michael D. Shear & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Director James Comey Is Fired by Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 9,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/james-comey-fired-fbi.html
[https://perma.cc/CQV7-SH6M (dark archive)].
385. See, e.g., Sean Sullivan et al., Finally Something Democrats and Republicans Agree On: Former FBI
Director Is Right Pick for Special Counsel, WASH. POST (May 17, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/finally-something-democrats-and-republicans-agree-onformer-fbi-director-is-right-pick-for-special-counsel/2017/05/17/32468266-3b20-11e7-9e48c4f199710b69_story.html [https://perma.cc/5MT7-6V3J (dark archive)].
386. See Sahil Chinoy, Jessia Ma & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump’s Growing Obsession with the ‘Witch
Hunt,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/08/22/opinion/trumpcohen-mueller-investigation.html [https://perma.cc/QKK8-CG89 (dark archive)] (“Since May 2017,
President Trump has tweeted more than 110 times about a ‘witch hunt,’ his way of diminishing the
ongoing investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election.”).
387. See Dana Farrington, Read: The Mueller Report, with Redactions, NPR (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/18/708850903/read-the-full-mueller-report-with-redactions
[https://perma.cc/FE2U-NW4A].
388. See 1 MUELLER, supra note 306, at 2, 33–34.

98 N.C. L. REV. 1077 (2020)

1138

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

several instances of the President’s obstructive behavior but did not determine
whether these incidents would constitute criminal obstruction of justice.389
Several months later, on July 22, Mueller testified somewhat tepidly in
Congress, and both political parties criticized the previously revered
prosecutor.390
Assessing a prosecutor’s job under the standards laid out above is difficult.
It is difficult because most discretionary decisions are necessarily invisible to
public scrutiny. Even the more public decisions, like Mueller’s choice not to
subpoena the President’s testimony, are made privately, so it is unclear how a
prosecutor reached a particular conclusion. Even if we had access to the
decisionmaking process, it is hard to measure a prosecutor’s discretionary
decisions because they necessarily involve weighing different public interest
concerns. Without access to all the facts Mueller and his team had at the time,
it is impossible to assess whether and how well the prosecutor weighed those
concerns. Not to mention that even if we did have all the relevant facts,
reasonable prosecutors can disagree about priorities and the relative weight to
place on different criminal justice concerns. There is no one prescription for
how these concerns ought to be weighed or which ones deserve priority.391
Rather than assess any of these discretionary decisions, this section argues
that Mueller followed DOJ policy, managed to find facts in a way that the public
credited, and, under severe attack from the President and others, consistently
appeared neutral, independent, and impartial. It is possible that Mueller’s effort
to appear impartial in the face of accusations to the contrary might have made
him more reticent than he would otherwise have been. If the legitimacy of DOJ
and his investigation in particular were not so consistently under attack, perhaps
he would have offered his conclusion about the obstructive behavior or
subpoenaed the President’s testimony instead of settling for written responses.
In his effort not to preempt Congress’s impeachment role, he may also have
been mindful to keep DOJ out of highly charged partisan politics at a time in
which it was being challenged as a part of the so-called “deep state,” a liberal
holdover, impeding the democratically elected President.392

389. See 2 MUELLER, supra note 306, at 182.
390. See, e.g., Olivia Beavers, Democrats Express Private Disappointment with Mueller Testimony, HILL
(July
25,
2019),
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/454823-democrats-express-privatedisappointment-with-mueller-testimony [https://perma.cc/GH4L-PDEH]; Burgess Everett,
Marianne Levine & Melanie Zanona, Republicans Turn on Mueller, POLITICO (May 1, 2019),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/05/01/mueller-gop-attacks-1296824 [https://perma.cc/H5BSGEGG].
391. See Green & Roiphe, A Fiduciary Theory of Prosecution, supra note 289, at 807.
392. See Mark Mazzetti & Katie Brenner, Mueller Finds No Trump-Russia Conspiracy, but Stops Short
of Exonerating President on Obstruction, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/03/24/us/politics/mueller-report-summary.html [https://perma.cc/U7L7-ZH3B (dark archive)].
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Like Barr, Mueller was operating in a difficult climate, with the President
consistently targeting him and his investigation. Mueller’s success in preserving
the reputation of his team as neutral, nonpolitical actors contrasts with Barr’s
inability to do so. Unlike Barr, Mueller did not lash out at the President for
tweeting. In fact, he said almost nothing during the investigation. But it is at
least possible he did make some choices differently with an eye toward
preserving the legitimacy of his work. Instead of complaining publicly, Barr too
could have gone out of his way to support the DOJ as an institution rather than
publicly second guessing career prosecutors. If he truly believed that DOJ was
behaving in a partisan way, he should have used proper existing mechanisms to
investigate, rather than involving himself directly, defying DOJ policy, and
seeming to do the President’s bidding.
In the course of the investigation, Mueller referred several matters to
United States Attorneys.393 One worth noting is the Southern District of New
York’s prosecution of Michael Cohen, the President’s attorney and fixer, for,
among other things, campaign finance violations.394 Prosecutors charged that
Cohen engaged in campaign finance violations “‘at the direction’ of ‘Individual1,’” referring clearly to then-candidate Trump.395 Cohen subsequently pled
guilty to lying to Congress, admitting that he did so to serve the President’s
political interest.396 The Southern District of New York seems to have acted
disinterestedly, analyzing facts and interviewing witnesses. It pursued the facts
and brought the case despite a barrage of criticism from the President himself.397
Thus, it seems as best as we can tell that prosecutors, for the most part, lived
up to the standards laid out above.
While Barr seeks to review these cases, there has, as yet, been no evidence
of partisan bias. If anything, it seems as if Mueller and the other prosecutors
involved have been reluctant to charge too aggressively. For instance, Mueller
stated that while it is illegal to accept foreign assistance for a campaign and the
President’s son, Donald Trump Jr., clearly did just that, “the government would
unlikely be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the June 9 meeting
participants had general knowledge that their conduct was unlawful.”398 Thus,
393. See Eliza Relman & Sonam Sheth, Mueller Referred 14 Criminal Matters to Other Prosecutors, but
Only 2 of Them Are Public So Far, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 18, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/
mueller-report-referred-criminal-matters-prosecutors-2019-4 [https://perma.cc/BK98-LXBY].
394. See id.
395. Id.
396. See Mark Mazzetti et al., Cohen Pleads Guilty and Details Trump’s Involvement in Moscow Tower
Project, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/29/nyregion/michael-cohentrump-russia-mueller.html [https://perma.cc/2J9C-53DF (dark archive)].
397. See Erica Orden, Rebecca Ballhaus & Michael Rothfeld, Agents Raid Office of Trump Lawyer
Michael Cohen in Connection with Stormy Daniels Payments, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fbi-raids-trump-lawyers-office-1523306297
[https://perma.cc/E2J5UACU (dark archive)].
398. 1 MUELLER, supra note 306, at 187.
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while prosecutors have been under significant pressure, there is no evidence
that they have abandoned a neutral professional role.
CONCLUSION
DOJ has evolved over the course of a century and a half to manage a much
more complex and vast federal criminal justice system. In expanding, it has
come to be more specialized and perhaps more efficient, but it has also divided
roles of lawyers in a way that preserves the independence, accountability, and
efficacy of the office. One of the purposes and results of these expansions and
added roles is that the Attorney General is now free to play a more overtly
political role because he is personally no longer responsible for the fair
interpretation or neutral enforcement of the laws. But in order to maintain the
balance within DOJ, he simultaneously has assumed the responsibility for
preserving the independence of DOJ and thereby protecting its legitimacy. He
achieves this goal by filtering improper partisan concerns from those
responsible for enforcing the law in a neutral, evenhanded way, but he also has
a role in protecting the legitimacy of the institution. To do so, the Attorney
General should not publicly allege political bias unless he has clear evidence and
even then should avail himself of existing mechanisms to check abuse, rather
than inventing his own.
As the examples from the Trump administration show, it is much harder
for the Attorney General to preserve the legitimacy of DOJ when the President
repeatedly comments on individual law enforcement decisions. It is not,
however, impossible. Despite the President’s repeated assaults, Mueller, for
example, managed to conduct the investigation into Russia’s meddling in the
2016 election in such a way that the public had, for the most part, faith in his
factual findings. The Attorney General’s role is more difficult if the President
does not respect the independence of the institution, but as long as he follows
norms, policies, and procedures, he too can do his part to preserve the
legitimacy of DOJ.
The Solicitor General has assumed the more neutral role, reflecting a
historical understanding of a part of the Attorney General’s function as quasijudicial. OLC is theoretically free to write opinions in a neutral manner, civil
attorneys can represent the public interest as articulated by agency heads, and
prosecutors are insulated from political pressure as they enforce the laws. As
detailed above, this division of labor has worked to a large extent. Thus DOJ as
a whole has stumbled toward a rational way to ensure that the lawyers who are
supposed to be neutral remain so and those who ought to be responsive to
administration priorities similarly can do their jobs. Politicians will be
politically accountable for the policies they adopt rather than the people or
entities they prosecute.
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Of course, there needs to be centralized control over DOJ, and the
Attorney General plays that role. But the professional norms, traditions, and
practices described in this Article help ensure that the institution as a whole
achieves a proper balance between responsiveness to the administration and
independence from political will.
The system has worked, more or less, with momentary failings but its basic
integrity intact. The Trump administration, however, has put a unique strain
on the system, exposing how vulnerable this structural order is and how
dependent it is on the integrity of individual DOJ lawyers. This Article leaves
for another day whether DOJ and other government legal positions can be
restructured so as to better protect this delicate balance. As an initial matter, it
is helpful to understand, articulate, and continue to hold lawyers within the
Justice Department responsible for the roles articulated above. It is reassuring
that, despite the undeniably extreme pressure that DOJ lawyers have
experienced in this administration, many have managed to live up to their roles
and responsibilities, ensuring that, while the reputation of DOJ has been badly
damaged during this administration, it has not been destroyed.
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